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Neoclassical economics is based on a model of a rational decision maker who
maximises his utility. However, a growing body of empirical evidence show that the
rational decision making model fails to describe how real people behave. The question
economists face is whether the empirical facts should be allowed to spoil the good story. I
think they should.
A relatively new area of reseazch in economics, which can be called "behavioral
economics", is aimed at closing that gap by improving the descriptive power of models.
While nonnative models aze typically based on a set of "rational" assumptions, the
descriptive models aze based on assumptions which are motivated by observed behavior.
The first step in building better descriptive models is finding the relevant
behavioral regularities. For that purpose economists adopted a tool, which psychologists
have been using for a very long time: Experiments.
This thesis contains a collection of papers which form my first steps into this
world.
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An Experiment on Risk Taking and Evaluation Periods~
Abstract: Does the period over which individuals evaluate outcomes influence their
investment in risky assets? Results from this study show that the more frequently returns are
evaluated, the more risk averse investors will be. The results aze in line with the behavioral
hypothesis of "myopic loss aversion," which assumes that people aze myopic in evaluating
outcomes over time, and aze more sensitive to losses than to gains. The results have relevance
for the equity premium puzzle, and also for the marketing strategies of fund managers.




Recently, Benartzi and Thaler (1995) put forwazd an explanation for the equity premium puzzle.
This puzzle refers to the fact that over the last century the risk-return relationship has been so
much more favorable for stocks than for bonds, that unreasonably high levels of risk aversion
would be needed to explain why investors aze willing to hold bonds at all (Mehra and Prescott,
1985). The explanation for this puzzle, advanced by Benartzi and Thaler, is called myopic loss
aversion (MLA), and rests on the combination of two behavioral concepts. The first concept is
loss aversion (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Tversky and Kahneman, 1992), which refers to the
tendency of individuals to weigh losses more heavily than gains. The second concept is mental
accounting (Kahneman and Tversky, 1984; Thaler, 1985), which refers to the implicit methods
people employ to code and evaluate financial outcomes.
The effect of combining these two concepts is perhaps best illustrated by means of a well-
known problem devised by Samuelson (1963). He asked a colleague whether he would be
willing to accept a gamble in which there are equal chances to win ~200 and to lose ~100. The
colleague declined this single gamble, but at the same time expressed a willingness to accept
multiple plays of the gamble. Although such a preference may have much intuitive appeal,
Samuelson proved a theorem, saying that if the single gamble is rejected at every relevant wealth
position, then accepting the multiple gamble is ínconsístent with expected utility maximization
(see Tversky and Baz-Hillel, 1983, for further discussion).
Benartzi and Thaler show that rejecting each single gamble, but accepting a sequence of
such gambles is consistent with MLA (see Kahneman and Lovallo, 1993, for a similaz
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azgument). If returns aze evaluated over a longer period of time, multiple gambles become more
attractive due to the lower probability that a loss will be experienced. To illustrate, suppose that
the individual is characterized by loss aversion and has a utility function u(z) - z for z? 0 and
u(z) - 2.Sz for z ~ 0, where z is the change in wealth due to the gamble. Then, the expected
utility of one gamble is negative: ll2(200) t ll2(-250) ~ 0. Hence, the individual will reject one
gamble, and also two gambles--if each is evaluated separately. The same individual, however,
accepts two gambles if (s)he evaluates them in combination: 1~4(400) t ll2(100) f 1~4(-500) ~ 0.
Hence, rejecting a single gamble while accepting two gambles is quite easily explained by the
combined hypotheses of individuals being more sensitive to losses than to gains and evaluating
the outcomes of the sequence ofgambles in combination.
As the example illustrates, predicts that the dynamic aggregation rules that people employ
influence their attitude towazd risk. In particulaz, the period over which individuals evaluate
financial outcomes influences their investments in risky assets. By means of theoretical
simulations, Benartzi and T'haler show that MLA could thus provide an explanation for the
equity premium puzzle. In pazticulaz, they show that the size of the equity premium is consistent
with investors evaluating their portfolios annually and weighing losses about twice as heavily as
gains.
However, Benartzi and Thaler do not present direct (experimental) evidence for the presence
of MIA The evidence presented in Benartzi and Thaler is only circumstantial. Hence, we seem
to have a choice anomaly-a choice rule that departs from standard theory-that could potentially
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explain an important phenomenon. Yet, there aze no direct and controlled tests that indicate that
the anomaly is real. Designing such a test is the purpose of this paper.z
We have experimental subjects making a sequence ofrisky choices. To analyze the presence
of MLA, we do not try to estimate the period over which subjects evaluate financial outcomes,
but rather we try to manipulate this evaluation period. In our setup, two groups of participants
are subjected to the same sequence of choices. Subjects in the first (high frequency) group aze
supplied with feedback information after each round of the sequence, and can change their choice
after each round. The subjects in the second (low frequency) group, however, get feedback
infotmation only after three rounds, and can only adapt their choices after three rounds. If our
design is successful in manipulating subjects' evaluation period, MLA would predict that the
low-frequency subjects make more risky choices. If subjects use a longer horizon to evaluate
outcomes, the trade-off between losses and gains becomes more favorable for the risky option.
At the same time, subjective expected utility (SEU) theory does not predict a systematic
difference in risk taking between the two treatments in our setup.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section explains and
motivates the design of the experimental test, and spells out the hypothesis. Section 3 presents
the results, and Section 4 concludes.
2 Independently, Thaler, Tversky, Kahneman, and Schwartz (1997) conducted a similar experiment.
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2. Design and procedure
Consider an individual who is confronted with a sequence of three independent but identical
lotteries, in which there is a probability of 2~3 to lose S 1 and a probability of l l3 to win ~2.50. If,
as is hypothesized by MLA, the individual weighs losses more heavily than gains, then the
attractiveness of the lotteries may depend on whether the financial consequences of the gambles
aze evaluated sepazately or in combination. For illustration, suppose that the individual weighs
losses relative to gains at a rate ofx~ 1. Then the expected utility of a single lottery is (2~3)x(- 1)
f(ll3)(2.5), which is positive only if x ~ 1.25. However, if a subject evaluates the three lotteries
in combination, then the expected utility is (1~27)(7.5) f(6127)(4) f(12127)(0.5) t(8~27)x(-3),
which is positive if x ~ 1.56. This is because the probability of a loss decreases from 0.67 for a
single lottery, to (0.67)3 - 0.30 for three consecutive lotteries. If the financial consequences of
the three lotteries aze evaluated in combination rather than sepazately, then the lotteries should
become more attractive.3 It is this basic prediction ofMLA that we tested in our experiment, by
manipulating the evaluation period of subjects.
In the experiment, subjects were confronted with a sequence of twelve identical but
independent rounds of a lottery (betting game). In each of the first nine rounds ("part 1" of the
experiment), subjects were endowed with 200 cents.4 They had to decide which part (X,) of this
endowment they wanted to bet in the lottery (0 S X, ~ 200, t- 1, ..., 9). In the lottery there was
3 This prediction only depends on losses weighing more heavfiy than gains,
and not on the utiliry function being piecewise linear.
4 At the time of the experiment, 1 guilder ( 100 cents) exchanged for about US á0.60.
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a probability of 2~3 of losing the amount bet and a probability of ll3 of winning two and a half
times the amount bet. Subjects were fully informed about the objective probabilities of winning
and losing, and about the corresponding size of gains and losses. It is important to stress that
subjects could not bet any money accumulated in previous rounds. Hence, the maximum bet in
each round is 200 cents, independently of the outcome of the bet in any of the previous rounds.
In rounds 10 through 12 ("part 2" of the experiment) subjects were no longer endowed with any
additíonal money from the experimenters. Rather, they had to make bets from the money earned
in part 1. To that purpose, a subject's earnings in the nine rounds of part 1 were first totalled and
then divided by three. The resulting amount was a subject's endowment (S) for each of the three
rounds of part 2. Again, for each round a subject had to decide which part (X,) of the endowment
S to bet in the lottery (0 ~ X, 5 S, t- 10, 11, 12).
The crucial feature of the design is that there were two different treatments: Treatment H
(high frequency) and Treatment L(low frequency). In Treatment H the subjects played the
rounds one by one. At the beginning of round 1 they had to choose how much of their
endowment of 200 cents to bet in the lottery. Then they were informed about the realization of
the lottery in round 1. Only then could they decide how much of their new endowment of 200
cents to bet for round 2, and so on. Hence, in this treatment subjects made nine betting decisions
in part 1 and three decisions in part 2. In Treatment L, however, subjects played the rounds in
blocks of three. At the beginning of round 1, subjects had to decide how much of their
endowment of 200 cents to bet in the lotteries of rounds 1, 2, and 3. In addition, these bets were
restricted to be equal. If a subject bet X in round 1, (s)he also bet X in rounds 2 and 3(that is, X~
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- XZ - X3, with 0 5 X, S 200). After subjects decided on their bets, they were informed about
the combined realization for rounds 1, 2, and 3. That is, they could not assign a gain or loss to
any particulaz round, but only knew the aggregate result. Subsequently, subjects decided how
much to bet in rounds 4, 5, 6, and so on. Hence, in Treatment L subjects make three decisions in
part 1, and one decision in part 2.
In Treatment L subjects chose their bet for the next three rounds; they had, therefore, less
freedom because they could not change their decision after every round. In particular, by the
design of Treatment L we have Xr - X,~~ - X~Z for t - 1, 4, 7, 10. In Treatment H these
equalities need not hold. Furthermore, the subjects in Treatment H were supplied with more
information than were the subjects in Treatment L. When deciding on X~, a subject in Treatment
H was always fully informed about the realizations and corresponding earnings of the previous
rounds. A subject in Treatment L, however, simultaneously decided about X„ X,~~, and X,~Z (t -
1, 4, 7, 10). A subject had to decide about X,~i (X,~Z) without knowing the realization for round t
(rounds t and t t 1). Hence, subjects in Treatment L were supplied with less freedom and less
information than those in Treatment H.
The basic idea behind the two treatments of our design is to manipulate the evaluation
period. In Treatment L the frequency of choice and information feedback was lower than in
Treatment H. As a result, the subjects in Treatment L can be expected to evaluate the financial
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consequences of betting in a more aggregated way. If the subjects aze characterized by MLA,
this should make them more apt to bet money in the lotteries.s
According to subjective expected utility (SEU) theory, there may be a difference between a
subject's behavior in Treatment H and Treatment L. This is so because, within each block of
three rounds, a subject in Treatment H has more information about the current wealth level in the
second and third round than does a subject in Treatment L. A subject in Treatment H observes
gains and losses along the way, and, contrary to a subject in Treatment H, can adjust bets
accordingly. The effect of this additional information cannot be unambiguously signed in
general.b In view of the small stakes involved in the experiment, however, the effect is likely to
be small indeed. Hence, with the assumption that wealth effects within each block of three
rounds on subjects' risk aversion are negligible, the natural hypothesis under SEU is that there
aze no systematic differences between average bets of the subjects in Treatment H and Treatment
L. This we use as our null hypothesis.
Procedure
We had fourteen experimental sessions, seven for each of the two treatments. The
experiment was administrated by pen and paper, and held in a seminar room with subjects seated
5 In principle, it would be possible to draw conclusions from only part 1 of the experiment. However, since the
subjects receive the 200 cents endowment from us, it is possible that they do not experience a lost bet as a"real"
loss. In part 2 of the experiment subjects bet their own money, "eamed" in part 1. Therefore, we expected that the
impact of loss aversion (if at all) would be amplified in part 2. On the other hand, in part 2 subjects' wealth positions
and experiences are more diverse. Hence, in part 2 we may also expect to find larger individual differences.
6 Gollier, Lindsey, and Zeckhauser (1997) derive sufficient conditions on the utility function for this information
effect to have an unambiguous sign. Translated to our setting, their results indicate that constant relative risk
aversion less than 1 would induce more risk taking in Treatment H than in Treatment L. Under constant absolute
risk aversion there should be no treatment effect.
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far apart. Six different subjects participated in each session (84 subjects in total).' Students were
recruited from Tilburg University. An announcement in the university bulletin solicited
participants for a decision-making experiment of about 40 minutes, with a rewazd that would
depend on their decisions, but which was likely to be somewhere between 5 and 35 Dutch
guilders. For each session eight subjects were invited; six would participate in the betting games,
one would act as an assistant, and one would serve as a spare in case of a no show.
Upon entering the room, a short standazd-type introduction was read to the subjects by the
experimenter. Subjects were informed that the experiment would consist of three parts, but that
they would be informed about the instructions of part 2 only after pazt 1 was finished. After the
introduction, each subject drew an envelope out of a stack. Six envelopes contained numbered
registration forms for part 1 of the experiment; one envelope contained a note with 'assistant,"
and one had an empty note (the latter envelope was removed when only seven subjects showed
up). The assistant was told that he would receive a payment equal to the average eatnings of the
other participants. The subject who drew the empty note was paid f10 for showing up and was
asked to leave the room.
Instructions (in Dutch) for part 1 were distributed and read aloud. After that, subjects could
examine the instructions for a few additional minutes, and (privately) ask questions.
Subjects were then asked to record their first bets. The lottery was conducted by the
assistant. To determine whether a subject gained or lost in a round's lottery, we used private "win
~ As it turned out, we had one subject who was in the experiment twice. We delete his second set of choices from
the data, leaving us with 41 observations in Treatment H.
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letters" which were indicated on the Registration Form. For subjects 1 and 2 the win letter was
A, for subjects 3 and 4 it was B, and for subjects 5 and 6 the win letter was C. We used different
win letters to introduce more variation in the realization of gains and losses within each session.
The assistant used a box containing three disks marked, respectively, A, B, and C. After the
subjects had recorded their bets for the round, the assistant first showed the contents of the box to
the subjects (to show that the box, in fact, contained an A, B, and C); (s)he then shook the box
and randomly took one disk out of the box. The letter on the disk was the so-called round letter
for the round. Ifa subject's private win letter matched the round letter, (s)he won in the lottery; if
the letters did not match, (s)he lost. Since there were three letters in the box, only one of which
matched a subject's win letter, the probability of winning in any round's lottery was 1~3, and the
probability of losing was 2~3.
In Treatment L the subjects fixed bets for three rounds, and three lotteries were conducted
by the assistant. For that purpose, the assistant used three boxes, each containing three disks
labeled A, B, and C. The assistant first showed the contents of each box to the subjects (to show
that each box, in fact, contained an A, B, and C); (s)he then shook the boxes and randomly took
one disk out of each box. The three disks drawn (one for each round) were then shown
simultaneously to the subjects.8 The letters on the three disks drawn were the round letters for
the present three rounds.
S The main purpose of our design is to manipulate the evaluation period of the subjects in Treatment L. We wanted
them to evaluate three consecutive lotteries in an aggregated way, without experiencing the losses and gains of each
separate lottery. Therefore, the outcomes of the three lotteries were shown to them simultaneously. In this way it
was not possible for them to attribute a gain or a loss to any particulaz round in the block of three.
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After each round (three rounds in Treatment L), subjects calculated and recorded their own
eanvngs on their registration form. We checked these calculations to make sure that they
understood the procedure, and that they did not cheat. Then subjects recorded their bets for the
next round (next three rounds in Treatment L).
At the end of the nine rounds, total earnings were calculated, and fotms were collected. The
experimenter divided these total earnings by three to detennine the starting endowment
(maximum bet) for each of the three rounds ofpart 2. This starting endowment (S) was indicated
on top of the Registration Fonn for part 2. These forms were distributed together with the
instructions for part 2. The instructions were read aloud, and then the three betting rounds for
part 2 were held. Again, subjects calculated their own earnings. After it was finished, all
subjects were paid.9 The assistant was paid the average earnings of the other subjects. That
concluded the experiment.
3.Results
Analyzing the results of part 1 is a straightforwazd exercise. We simply compare the
average percentage of the endowment (of 200 cents) bet in the lottery for the two treatments. To
ease comparison, we take the average percentage of endowment bet in blocks of three rounds.
These averages and the corresponding standard deviations (across individuals) aze presented in
Table 1. The final row ofTable 1 gives the average percentage of endowment bet over all rounds.
The results display a clear treatment effect. In each round average bets are lazger for
treatment L than for treatment H. To determine the significance of the differences, we use the
nonparametric Mann-Whitney test.~o The final column reports z-values, which are a
transfonnation of the Mann-Whitney U-value conected for the presence of ties. These z-values
9In fact, after part 2 was finished, there was a short supplementary part in the experiment. In this part we tried to
obtain additional information about subjects' risk preferences. This part, however, is not directly relevant to the
present test.
~o We cannot use the parametric t-test. This test assumes that the observations come from a normal Distribution,
which is not possible, given the lower- and upper- bound of 0 and 100, respectively. Also, a Kolmogorov-Smirnov
test rejects the hypothesis that the observations are from a norrnal distribution.
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would suggest that subjects are, at least to a substantial extent, forward looking when they
evaluate ("mentally account") risky decisions.
This seems to be in line with Benartzi and Thaler, who formulate MLA in terms of
"prospective" utility. An additional hypothesis could be that experiencing (not just anticipating)
gains and losses affects subjects' risk behavior. For such a backward looking hypothesis we find
no support. In the course of the experiment, the subjects in Treatment H experience losses more
frequently than do the subjects in Treatment L. If this were a driving force behind the difference
between the two treatments, then we would expect this difference to be stronger in the final
round(s) than in the first round(s). No support for this is found in the data. Moreover, we find
no effect of different experiences with gains and losses between subjects.1z The fraction of
endowment bet is not significantly affected by subjects' experiences with the occurrence of gains
and losses in the preceding round(s).
In part 2, subjects' endowments were again identical across rounds, but contrary to part 1,
they differed across individuals. In each of the three rounds, a subject's endowment was equal to
1~3 of his or her earnings (W) from part 1 of the experiment (S - W~3). As a consequence, for
each subject we have two variables of interest: first, the absolute amount bet, Y:- ~,-~o.i~, ~Z,Y~
(5 W), where for Treatment L we have Xio - X~~ - X~Z, and, second, the percentage of the
endowment bet in the lottery, F: - 100Y1W. T'he averages of both variables are presented in the
first two rows of Table 2.
~Z For example, within each treatment we compazed the bets of the subjects who had just experienced a gain with those
who had just experienced a loss. If subjects were backward looking, we would expect the bets to be higher for the
former than for the latter group. The effect is in the other direction, however. Although this finding is statistically
insignificant, bets are larger after a loss than aRer a gain.
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It appears that the treatment effect is in the same direction as in part 1. On average, subjects
in Treatment L bet more in the risky lottery than do their counterparts in Treatment H. Both in
absolute and relatíve terms, bets were larger if subjects were supplied with less information
feedback and less freedom of choice. For the amount bet (1~, the difference is again highly sig-
nificant. For the percentage of endowment bet (~, the difference between the two treatments is
less pronounced but still (marginally) significant. As the final row of Table II indicates, the in-
creased willingness to take risks also pays off. Average total earnings (parts 1 and 2) in
Treatment L are significantly larger than those in Treatment H.
Treatment H Treatment La Mann-Whitney z
Amount bet (Y) 707.3 (614.5) 887.1 (662.1) -2.14 [0.016]
Percentage bet (F) 39.0 (30.0) 48.9 (32.1) -1.62 [0.053]
Total earnings (parts 1 and 2) 1822 (1015) 2134 (745) -1.78 [0.038]
Table 2: Average amount bet, average percentage bet, and average total eamings. a. tt obs. - 41 (42) for treatment
H(L). Standazd deviations are in parentheses and, b. One-tailed significance levels (p-values) are in brackets.
4. Conclusions
This paper presents a direct experimental test of the prediction of myopic loss aversion
(MLA), that a longer evaluation period makes a risky option with positive expected return look
more amactive. Our results strongly support this prediction. We manipulated the evaluation
period of one group of experimental subjects by giving them less information feedback and less
freedom of adjustment than a control group. This manipulation was intended to make subjects
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evaluate risky financial investments in a more aggregated way. As a consequence, they are less
likely to be deterred by the occurrence of losses. In particular, we observe higher earnings for
the subjects who evaluate their investment in a more aggregate way. The results provide support
for Benartzi and Thaler's (1995) explanation of the equity premium puzzle.
The results may also have practical relevance. Manipulating the evaluation period of
prospective clients could be a useful mazketing strategy for fund managers. Our results suggest
that providing investors with less frequent information feedback about how a particular risky
fund is doing might make the fund appear more attractive by decreasing the likelihood that a loss
will be experienced. Similazly, if investors are given less freedom of adjustment ("tying their
hands"), this may induce them to evaluate financial outcomes in a more aggregated way, and
help them to resist the temptation to drop out after the occasional setback.
Of course, our experiment is highly stylized. For example, the subjects in the experiment
only face risk (known probabilities ofpossible outcomes), whereas real-life investors mainly deal
with uncertainty (unknown probabilities). Another issue is that our experiment took less than an
hour, whereas the time elapsing between real investment decisions is usually much longer. Fur-
thermore, the financial stakes for the experimental subjects aze low compared with those ofmost
real-world decision-makers. These features aze a cause for caution in extrapolating of the results.
They also suggest lines along which to pursue further experimental work.
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Appeudix: excerpt of iostructions
(Translated from Dutch; full instructions are available upon request.)
Introduction [Read aloud only]
Welcome to ow experimental study of decision-making. The experiment will last about 40
minutes. The instructions for the experiment aze simple, and if you follow them carefully, you
can earn a considerable amount of money. All the money you eam is yows to keep, and will be
paid to you, privately and in cash, immediately after the experiment.
The experiment will consist of three parts. The instructions for the second part will
be distributed to you after the first part has been finished. The instructions for part 3 will be
announced at the completion of part 2. Before we start the experiment, however, you will be
asked to pick one envelope from this pile. In the envelope you will find yow so-called
Registration Form. This form will be used to register yow decisions and eaznings. One of you,
however, will find the announcement'assistant' in the envelope. This person will assist us dwing
the experiment, and will receive a payment that is equal to the average eamings of the other
participants in the experiment.
On top of yow Registration Form you will find yow registration number This number
indicates behind which table you aze to take a seat. A sepazate table is reserved for the assistant.
When everyone is seated, we will go through the instructions of part 1 of the experiment. After
that, you will have the opportunity to study the instructions on yow own, and to ask questions. If
you have a question, please raise yow hand, and I will come to yow table. Please do not talk or
communicate with the other participants during the experiment.
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Are there any questions about what has been said until now? If not, then will the person on
my left please be the first to pick an envelope, open it, and take the con esponding seat.
Instructions for part 1 [Treatment H; Read aloud and distributed]
Part 1 of the experiment consists of 9 successive rounds. In each round you will start with
an amount of 200 cents (fL). You must decide which part of this amount (between 0 cents and
200 cents) you wish to bet in the following lottery.
You have a chance of 2~3 (670~0) to lose the amount you bet and a chance of ll3 (330~0) to
win two and a half times the amount you bet.
You are requested to record your choice on your Registration Fonn. Suppose that you
decide to bet an amount ofX cents (0 5 X 5 200) in the lottery. Then you must fill in the amount
X in the column headed Amount in lottery, in the row with the number of the present round.
Whether you win or lose in the lottery partly depends on your personal win letter. This letter
is indicated on the top of your Registration Fonn. Your win letter can be A, B, or C, and is the
same for all 9 rounds. In any round you win in the lottery if your win letter matches the round
letter that will be drawn by the assistant, and you lose if your win letter does not match the round
letter.
The round letter is detennined as follows. After you have recorded your bet in the lottery for
the round, the assistant will, in a random manner, pick one letter from a box containing three
letters: A, B, and C. The letter drawn is the round letter for that round. If the round letter
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matches your win letter you win in the lottery; otherwise you lose. Since there aze three letters,
one of which matches your win letter, the chance of winning in the lottery is 1~3 (330~0) and the
chance of losing is 2~3 (67"~0).
Hence, your earnings in the lottery are detennined as follows. Ifyou have decided to put an
amount ofX cents in the lottery, then your earnings in the lottery for the round are equal to -X if
the round letter does not match your win letter (you lose the amount bet) and equal to f2.5X if
the round letter matches your win letter (you win two and a half times the amount bet).
The round letter will be shown to you by the assistant. You need to record this letter in the
column Round letters, under win or lose, depending on whether the round letter does or does not
match your win letter. Also you need to record your earnings in the lottery in the column
Earnings in lottery. Your total earnings for the round aze equal to 200 cents (your starting
amount) plus your earnings in the lottery. These earnings aze recorded in the column Total
earnings, in the row of the corresponding round. Each time we will come by to check your
Registration Form.
After that, you aze requested to record your choice for the next round. Again you start with
an amount of 200 cents, a part of which you can bet in the lottery. The sazne procedure as de-
scribed above determines your earnings for this round. It is noted that your private win letter
remains the same, but that for each round a new round letter is drawn by the assistant. All subse-
quent rounds will also proceed in the same manner. After the last round has been completed,
your earnings in all rounds will be totaled. This amount determines your total earnings for part 1
of the experiment. Then the instructions for part 2 of the experiment will be announced.
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Instructions for part 1 [Treatment L; Read aloud and distributed]
Part 1 of the experiment consists of 9 successive rounds. In each round you will start with
an amount of 200 cents (fl). You must decide which part of this amount (between 0 cents and
200 cents) you wish to bet in the following lottery.
You have a chance of 2~3 (670~0) to lose the amount you bet and a chance of ll3 (330~0) to
win two and a half times the amount you bet.
You aze requested to record your choice on your Registration Form. Suppose that you
decide to bet an amount ofX cents (0 5 X 5 200) in the lottery. Then you must fill in the amount
X in the column headed Amount in lottery. Please note that you fix your choice for the next three
rounds. Thus, if you decide to bet an amount X in the lottery for round 1, then you also bet an
amount X in the lottery for rounds 2 and 3. Therefore, three consecutive rounds are joined
together on the Registration Form.
Whether you win or lose in the lottery partly depends on your personal win letter. This
letter is indicated on the top of your Registration Form. Yow win letter can be A, B, or C, and is
the same for all 9 rounds. In any round you win in the lottery if your win letter matches the
round letter that will be drawn by the assistant, and you lose ifyour win letter does not match the
round letter.
The round letter is determined as follows. After you have recorded your bet in the lottery
for the next three rounds, the assistant will, in a random manner, for each of the next three rounds
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pick one letter from a box containing three letters: A, B, and C. For each of the three rounds a
letter is drawn from a different box. The three letters drawn aze the round letters for the present
three rounds. If the round letter matches your win letter, you win in the lottery; otherwise you
lose. Since each box contains three letters, one of which matches your win letter, the chance of
winning in the lottery in a given round is ll3 (330~0) and the chance of losing is 2l3 (670~0).
Hence, your earnings in the lottery for the three rounds are determined as follows. If you
have decided to put an amount ofXcents in the lottery, then your earnings in the lottery aze equal
to X for each round letter that does not match your win letter (you lose the amount bet for the
round) and equal to t2.5X for each round letter that matches your win letter (you win two and a
half times the amount bet for the round).
The three round letters will be shown to you by the assistant. You need to record these
letters in the column Round letters, under win or lose, depending on whether the round letter
does or does not match your win letter. You also need to record your earnings in the lottery in
the column Earnings in lottery. Your total earnings for the three rounds are equal to 600 cents
(three times your starting amount of200 cents) plus your earnings in the lottery. These earnings
aze recorded in the column Total earnings, in the row of the corresponding rounds. Each time
we will come by to check your Registration Form.
After that, you are requested to record your choice for the next three rounds (4-6). For each
of the three rounds you again start with an amount of 200 cents, a part of which you can bet in
the lottery. The same procedure as described above determines your earnings for these three
rounds. It is noted that your private win letter remains the same, but that for each round a new
round letter is drawn by the assistant. The subsequent three rounds (7-9) will also proceed in the
same manner. After the last round has been completed, your eanvngs in all rounds will be
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totaled. This amount detennines your total earnings for part 1 of the experiment. Then the
instructions for part 2 of the experiment will be announced.
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Chapter 2
Probability Judgments in Multi-Stage Problems:
Experimental Evidence of Systematic Biases~
Abstract: We report empirical evidence that in problems of random walk with positive drift,
bounded rationality leads individuals to underestimate the probability of success in the long run.
In particulaz, individuals who were given the stage-by-stage probability disterbution failed to
aggregate this infotmation in a multi-stage case. Estimations of the long-run probability
distribution did not differ much from the given stage-by-stage probability distribution, and were
systematically lower than the accurate one. Applications to risk perception in financial markets
aze considered.
~ This paper was first published in Acta Psychologica 93 (1996) 59-68.
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1. Introduction
The standazd approach to sequential decision making under uncertainty (i.e. the Savage (1954)
subjective expected utility theory) assumes that people are indifferent to the way problems aze
set, and are only interested in the probability distribution over final outcomes (see Hammond,
1988; Machina, 1989). In particulaz, people aze assumed to follow the reduction of compotutd
lotteries axiom, stating that a multi-stage lottery is equally attractive as the one-stage lottery that
yields the same prizes with the corresponding multiplied probabilities. For example, consider the
following two lotteries: in the first, a fair coin is tossed twice in a row. If it falls on its head
twice or on its tail twice, the decision maker wins ~1; he loses S1 if it falls once on each side. In
the second lottery, two fair coins are tossed at the same time, and the payoffs aze the same as in
the first lottery. The reduction axiom states that the decision maker is indifferent between the
first and the second lottery.
While there exists a literature following Kahneman and Tversky (1979) (see Caznerer,
1995, for a short survey) that questions this axiom, a common assumption is that people are
capable of accurately estimating the reduced probabilities of compound lotteries, or at least that
mistakes are not systematic, and estimations are accurate on average. This is surprising because
it is not difficult to construct sequential problems in which, for bounded rationality reasons,
people fail to estimate reduced probabilities (see the book edited by Kahneman et al., 1982, or
the works of Baz-Hillel, 1973, and Wagenaaz and Sagaria, 1975, which aze described below).
This paper looks at a different aspect of this problem, namely processes of random walk
with positive drift, which are very important in many real-life economic decisions. We test
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whether probability judgment is 'good' in this kind of environment, or is it systematically biased -
and if so how. Versions of the following investment game2 are used:
An option on the price ofa stock is for sale. Today the price of the stock is ~x, and every
day it either goes up or down by S 1, with probability p and 1- p respectively. The
option will be realized and pay SO if the price of the stock will reach ~0, and ~n if the
price will reach Sn. What is the probability that the realization price will be ~n?
Results of three experiments with the game are reported, in which we controlled for the
following three parameters:
1. we changed the starting amount to x- S3, ~5, and á7, fixingp- 0.6 and n- 10,
2. we changed the size of the interval to n- 4, 6, 10, and 14, when x- n I 2 and p- 0.6, and
3. for x - 5 and n- 10, we changed the stage-by-stage probability of success to p - 0.55, 0.58,
0.6, 0.65, and 0.7.
The results suggest that people use the stage-by-stage probability as an anchor, and adjust
insufficiently. Estimations are biased toward the direction of the stage-by-stage probability,
resisting in underestimation of the overall probability of success. One consequence is that while
individuals do quite well in estimating the probabilities in `small' intervals, in which the
compound probability does not differ much from the stage-by-stage probability, they fail to
appreciate the affect of enlarging the interval i.e., the fact that the probability of success
2 A similaz game, known as "The gambler's ruin problem", is a classical problem in the random walk literature.
Early solutions by Bernoulli and De Moivrc are described in Thatcher (1957). For detailed solutions see Ross
(1989). This literature was not concerned with the bounded rationality aspects of this problem.
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increases. For that reason, for the values of n tested, underestimations increased with n. Another
consequence is that subjects fail to fully appreciate increases in the stage-by-stage probability,
i.e. the fact that a'small' increase in the stage-by-stage probability implies a'lazge' increase in the
overall probability of success.
In the paper we try to get some insight into the relevance of this to 'real-life' problems,
such as the equity premium puzzle. It may be that the failure of traditional risk measures to
explain behavior in many cases is not a case of a bad theory of risk behavior, as much as a simple
misjudgment of the objective probabilities by people. See Arrow (1982).
2. Computing the compound probability of success
Let ps(t) be the probability of getting n after t stages for a player who starts with x.
Denote the infinite case by px , i.e. pX - lim ,~, ~ pX(t). The probabilities px satisfy the following
system ofequations:
p„ - 1
PX - (1 -P) xPx-r } P xPxt~
Po-O
for O~x~n,
Proposition 2.1. The explicit solution of the system, for p~ 0.5 is:
P(x) -
~(1 -P)P ~~ X - 1
~(1 -P)P-~~ n- 1
Proof. This is a system ofn f 1 lineaz equations in n} 1 unknowns ( po, ..., p„). It is easily seen
that the detenninant of the system is non-zero, hence, the system has at most one solution. Direct
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verification shows that the equation in the proposition is a solution to the system. Hence it must
be the unique solution. 0
In Table 1 are the pX's for a few different x's and p's. n- 10.
p-O.S p-O.SS p-0.S8 p-0.6 p-0.6S p-0.7
P~o 1 ] ] 1 1 1
P9 0.9 0.96 0.98 0.99 0.998 0.9997
PS 0.8 0.91 0.96 0.98 0.995 0.9990
P~ 0.7 0.86 0.93 0.96 0.989 0.9976
P6 0.6 0.79 0.89 0.93 0.978 0.9940
PS O.S 0.71 0.83 0.88 0.957 0.9857
P4 0.4 0.62 0.75 0.82 0.918 0.9670
P3 0.3 O.S 1 0.65 0.72 0.850 0.9200
Pz 0.2 0.37 O.S O.S7 0.710 0.8200
Pi 0.1 0.20 0.29 0.34 0.460 O.S700
Pa 0 0 0 0 0 0
Table 1: Values of p, are the probabilities of reaching n- 10, starting with x, when p is the stage-by-stage
probabiliry
3. Method and results
In this section, experimental results from three experiments aze presented, showing
underestimation.
3.1 Experiment 1: Changing the startingamount with experienced subjects
We wanted to cheek whether having some 'experience' with the game will make the
estimates more accurate. First yeaz students in economics at Tilburg University participated in
the experiment. The students played a version of the game (see Appendix A) for real money.3
3 We used Dutch guilders, scaling the game such that the change in prize in every stage was f 2.5 instead of S l, e.g.
when we say that the game started with SS it actually started with f 12.5 (at the time f2.5 - á 1.6). To reduce
confusion, we continue presenting the results in dollars.
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Each student played privately and independently of the others. In total 28 subjects participated;
10 students started with á3, 10 with SS and 8 students with S7. The probability used was p-
0.58, and n- 10. Each session took at most 30 minutes. After playing, subjects were asked
indirectly (see Appendix B) about their estimations. This was done in order to check whether the
mistakes resulted from confusion created by terms like 'Probability' and 'chance'. Their responses
are presented in Table 2.
Subject Start with S3 Subject Start with á5 Subject Start with S7
1 0.85 11 0.95 21 0.85
2 0.75 12 0.80 22 0.83
3 0.70 13 0.70 23 0.80
4 0.62 14 0.70 24 0.75
5 0.58 15 0.58 25 0.58
6 0.58 ]6 0.58 26 0.58
7 0.58 17 0.58 27 0.58
8 0.40 18 0.58 28 0.44
9 0.25 19 0.37
10 0.05 20 0.30
Mean 0.536 Mean 0.614 Mean 0.676
Actual p~ 0.646 Actual px 0.834 Actual px 0.933
Table 2: The right column in each starting amount gives the estimated px for subjects who first played the game
fond real money. p- 0.58 and n- l0. For each x, subjects are ordered by their estimation
Twenty-four out of the 28 subjects underestimated pX. This first experiment shows that
underestimation exists, even after some experience in playing. An interesting observation is that,
on average, playing more stages (more 'experience') did not result in more accurate estimations.
Another experiment, not incentive motivated, used 16 seminaz participants (professors and Ph.D
students in economics) from Tilburg University as subjects. Each subject was asked to estimate
px for 4 different x's. Although these subjects aze not'normal people', in the sense that they know
more about probability theory than most people, 54 out of the 64 responses underestimated px.
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3.2 Experiment 2: Changing the size of the interval
Most of the literature on sequential decision problems uses two stage lotteries as a sole
representation of dynamics. This is done under the assumption that moving from one-stage to
two-stage lotteries captures the essential aspects of dynan-iics, and moving from two-stage to
multi-stage lotteries is trivial. We show that in our random walk example, there is no
'irrationality' in a two-stage set-up, but subjects become 'more itrational' with every stage added.
To do this, different sizes of intervals were used, keeping the rest of the rules the same.
In Table 3 are the reduced probabilities for different values of n. when starting with x- nl2
(calculated using Proposition 2. 1).
n 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 50
P„ l2 0.60 0.69 0.77 0.84 0,88 0.92 0.94 0.96 0.97 0.98 0.99996
Table 3: The probabilities of reaching different values of n, when p- 0.6, and starting at n ~2
As one can see, the reduced probabilities converge to 1 very rapidly. The question raised
now is, would subjects, although underestimating the reduced probabilities, understand that they
converge to 1 ?
We used undergraduate students in economics, and gave them monetary incentives to
find the accurate probabilities. We had 4 groups of subjects, one with 4 subjects, one with 5, and
2 with 6 subjects each. Appendix C is an example of a questionnaire for n - 4. The results aze
presented in Table 4.
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Subject n - 4 Subject n- 6 Subject n- 10 Subject n- 14
1 0.8 1 0.8 1 1 1 0.94
2 0.7 2 0.67 2 0.8 2 0.8
3 0.6 3 0.6 3 0.65 3 0.6
4 0.5 4 0.6 4 0.6 4 0.6
5 0.6, 5 0.35 5 0.6
6 0.36 6 0.6
Mean 0.65 Mean 0.605 Mean 0.68 Mean 0.69
Actual p, 0.69 Actual px 0.77 Actual px 0.88 Actual px 0.94
Table 4: Estimations of P„n for different values ofn
The underestimates are robust even under this treatment (16 out of 21 subjects, but 9 out
of 11 for n- 10 and n- 14), and the size and frequency of underestimations increase with n.
Another observation is that the mean of the observations, within the range of 4 ~ n ~ 14, did not
converge to 1, i.e. the expectations aze not monotonic and do not differ much from each other.
Subject Prob 0.55 Subject Prob 0.6 Subject Prob 0.65 Subject Prob 0.7
1 0.90 16 0.99 31 0.90 46 0.99
2 0.68 17 0.80 32 0.85 47 0.83
3 0.59 18 0.77 33 0.82 48 0.82
4 0.59 19 0.73 34 0.80 49 0.70
5 0.57 20 0.70 35 0.74 50 0.70
6 0.55 21 0.69 36 0.70 51 0.70
7 0.55 22 0.65 37 0.65 52 0.70
8 0.55 23 0.64 38 0.65 53 0.70
9 0.55 24 0.60 39 0.65 54 0.70
10 0.55 25 0.60 40 0.65 55 0.65
11 0.55 26 0.60 41 0.60 56 0.60
12 0.55 27 0.52 42 0.58 57 0.58
13 0.55 28 0.50 43 0.50 58 0.30
14 0.45 29 0.20 44 0.50 59 0.17
15 ' 30 ' 45 0.35 60 '
Mean 0.58 Mean 0.64 Mean 0.66 Mean 0.65
Actual 0.73 Actual 0.88 Actual 0.96 Actual 0.99
Table 5: Estimations ofp~ for different values ofp, x- 5 and n- 10. ' Observations that did not add up to one.
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3.3 Experiment 3: Changing the stage-by-stage probability
In this experiment we fixed x - 5 and n- 10, and varied p. We used 60 first year
economics students, in four groups of 15 subjects. Each group was asked about one p.
Instructions were similar to those of Experiment 2, but a different reward scheme was used (see
Appendix D). The results are presented in Table 5.
Again we see underestimations ofpX (54 out of 57 subjects), and we see that changing p
did not change the mean of the estimations which, apart from the case of p- 0.55, are almost
identical. This implies that subjects were not sensitive to changes inp.
4. Discussion: Anchoring and adjustment heuristic
The evidence indicates that when estimating the compound probability of success (px), subjects
use the stage-by-stage probability of success (p) as an anchor. Apparently, subjects 'start' with p,
anchor to that, and either do not adjust at all, or adjust insufficiently to changes in the pazameters.
In total, 40 out of the 106 estimations were p- pX. Moreover, if we look at a comparison of the
distance ~( pp - mean)~( p- mean)~, as done in Table 6, we see that the mean of estimates was at
least 2.5 times closer to p than to px for all but the n- 4 case in Experiment 2.
The consequence of changing the starting amount was tested in Experiment 1, where it
was shown that there is some adjustment, always in the conect direction, but the adjustment is
insufficient. In Experiment 2 we changed the size of the interval, and found no sign of
adjustment. Experiment 3 shows that estimations are not sensitive to changes in the stage-by-
stage probability.
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P Ps mean ~(px, - mean)I(p - mean)~
Experiment 1
1 0.58 0.646 0.536 2.5
2 0.58 0.834 0.614 6.5
3 0.58 0.933 0.676 2.7
Experiment 2
1 0.60 0.69 0.650 0.08
2 0.60 0.77 0.605 33
3 0.60 0.88 0.680 2.5
4 0.60 0.94 0.690 2.8
Experiment 3
1 0.55 0.73 0.58 5
2 0.60 0.88 0.64 6
3 0.65 0.96 0.66 30
4 0.70 0.99 0.65 6.8
Table 6: Compazison of the distance ~( p~, - mean)I(p - mean)~ using the mean of estimations, p, and p; from all the
experiments
This is not the first attempt to look at estimations of compound probabilities. Bar-Hillel
(1973) investigated the hypothesis that the subjective probability of compound events are
systematically biased in the direction of their components, resulting in overestimation of the
likelihoods of conjunctive events and underestimation of the likelihood of disjunctive events, e.g.
a probability of a conjunctive event may be the probability of winning 5 times in a row, and the
probability of a disjunctive event is the stage-by-stage probability. Bar-Hillel concluded that "...
The probability of the individual stage in a chain ofevents thus appeazs to have greater influence
on the evaluation of the whole chain's probability than the number of stages in question" (p. 405).
This is similaz to our result in the sense that people anchor to the probability of the individual
stage, and fail to fully appreciate the affect of enlarging the number of stages. However, this
work focuses on the probability of a certain path, and not on the probability of outcomes. Note
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also that increasing the number of stages has an opposite effect as compared to our story, i.e. it
reduces the compound probability.
Other studies that report underestimation in multi-stage problems, aze Wagenaaz and
Sagaria (1975), and Wagenaaz and Tinuners (1979). These studies consider a different type of
problem, namely estimations of exponential growth. They show that exponential growth is
considerably underestimated; people tend to extrapolate exponentially, that is with a constant
multiplier for successive steps, but with an exponent that is too small.
5. Application to financial markets
We showed that in a bounded random walk set-up, with positive drift, most subjects
underestimate the reduced probabilities of reaching the upper bound. Why should this result
interest economists? For example, the traditional finance literature assumes that asset prices in
an efficient capital mazket follow a random walk with positive drift, i.e. that capital markets
"have no memory" (Brealey and Myers, 1988, p. 289).4 Our findings suggest that investors will
fail to appreciate the difference in the retums between the short and the long run. For example, a
stock that is traded daily, and whose price follows a random walk with a known 'very small' daily
positive expected return, rnay do 'very well' in the long run, much better than people expect it to
do on the basis of its daily performance. This implies that investors' perceived risk of that kind
of asset is systematically higher than the objective risk and, as a result, assets aze undervalued.
4 This approach is controversial nowadays (e.g. Fama, 1991, or De Bondt and Tbater, 1994). Yet as a first
approximation it is still accepted, and that is enough for our case.
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Another difficulty investors inay have is underestimating the chance that a slightly better asset
(higher p) will accumulate much lazger wealth in the long run.
For example the equity premium puzzle, which is the empirical fact that stocks have
outperformed bonds over the last century in a way that is hazd to explain with plausible levels of
investor risk aversion (Mehra and Prescott, 1985), may paztly be the result of investors'
misjudgment of risk.
One obvious question is whether mazkets would 'fix' these underestimations. The
problem is that, since the 'objective probabilities' in the stock market aze unknown, there cannot
be any empirical proof of the kind given in this paper. It may be that the price in a mazket will
reflect the accurate probabilities even if (most) participants aze not able to correctly estimate
these probabilities. On the other hand, there is evidence that markets aze not always efficient
(e.g. De Bondt and Thaler, 1994). For an elaborated discussion about the role of risk perception
in financial mazkets see Arrow (1982).
In future reseazch, we would like to address this question, with the aim of tackling
Camerer's challenge "Whether judgment and choice violations matter in mazkets is a question
that begs for empirical analysis" (Camerer, 1987, p. 981).
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Appendix A
A.1 Instructionsfor subjects who played the gamefor real money
In a few minutes we will give you á5 and ask if you want to participate in a game in
which at every step you can either win or lose ál. The chance of winning ~1 is 580~o and the
chance of losing ~1 is 420~0. If you choose to leave the game, you can stop and take the ~5. If
you decide to play, you will either have ~4 or S6 after the first stage. Then, you can leave the
game with your money, or participate in the next stage, in which, again, you can either win or
lose ~1 with the same chances as before. The game goes on until either you choose to stop, or
your money reaches {~0 or ~10}, or after 100 stages.s
Appendix B
B.1 Indirect methodfor finding estimations (note that the question is phrased such thal
it is equivalent to the initial problem)
Say that we take 100 students and let them play the game, with one difference: they will
have to play till á0 or ~10. Can you guess how many of theni will end up with ~0 and how many
with á10?
5 The probabiliry that the gaine will not end within 100 stages is less than 0.001, hencep, is relevant even
for t- 100. For a discussion of the use of this restriction see Gneery (1995).
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Appendix C
C.1 Estimations for different sizes ofintervals with monetary incentives (for n- 4)
Please answer the following question, which is also given to other students in the room.
After all ofyou have finished answering, we will collect and check the answers. We will find the
best answer and give ~10 to the student who gave it. If snore than one student gives the best
answer, we will split the money between the students who gave this answer.
The game: Mr. X is given ~2 and then a series of lotteries take place. In each lottery he either
wins or loses S 1. The chance of winning S 1 is 600~o and the chance of losing á 1 is 400~0. So, after
the first lottery, Mr. X will either have á3 (with 600~o chance) or ~1 (with 400~o chance), and so
on. The lotteries will be conducted till Mr. X will either have á0 or ~4.
The problem: What do you think is the chance that Mr. X will:
(a) finish with á4?
(b) finish with ~0?
Appendix D
D.1 you will be paid according to the following rule
you will start with 515, and for every lo~o of `mistake' ~1 will be deduced from your
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payoff. The mistake is the absolute value of [your guess (in percentages) minus the actual
chance]. For example, if you guess accurately, you get ~15. If you make a l00~o mistake (either
overestimate or underestimate), you get ~5. If your mistake is bigger than or equal to 150~o you
will not be paid at all.
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Chapter 3
Experimental Investigation of Perceived Risk in Finite
Random Walk Processes 1
Abstract: The hypothesis that, on average, people accurately estimate probabilities in random
walk processes is experimentally investigated. Individuals are confronted with a process that
starts with SX, and in every stage either goes up or down by ~1, with probabilities p and 1- p
respectively. For different values ofp, individuals were asked to estimate what is the chance that
after 10 stages the system will be at a point higher than or equal to ~X. Systematic mistakes in
estimations were observed. In particular, estimations were centered around the stage-by-stage
probability (p) rather then around the actual probability. We connect this finding to recently
developed explanations of the equity premium puzzle.
~ This is a joint project with Marcel Das
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1. Introduction
There is a lazge psychological literature concerning the way individuals estimate probabilities. In
particular, many systematic biases aze documented (see e.g. the book edited by Kahneman et al.
[1982]). This line of research was criticized recently. See the discussion in Kahneman and
Tversky [1996] and Gigerenzer [1996] and the references there. One of the reasons of the
critique is that the relevance of these studies to economic problems is not always clear. In this
paper we consider probability estimation in random walk processes. These type ofprocesses are
of great importance in finance, since they aze assumed to describe price changes in so-called
efficient mazkets (see Section 4). Clearly, systematic mistakes in probability estimation will lead
to systematic mistakes in risk perception. This may be helpful in understanding observations
from real mazkets, and in developing a better behavioral theory.
We experimentally investigate whether people assess the probability of several outcomes
after N periods correctly, and if not, aze the mistakes systematically 'optimistic' (pessimistic), i.e.
viewing the process as less (more) risky than it really is. At this point no explicit definition of
risk is given; it will be cleaz in the context of the experiment. We use the following setup:
An investor is given a stock that is worth áX. Then a process of N stages begins. In
every stage, the price of the stock either goes up or down by ~1, with probability p and
1- p respectively. If the price of the stock reaches SO within N stages, then the stock
will be worth SO for ever.
Problem: What do you think is the probability that the stock will be worth at least áX
after N stages (px)?
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We investigated this game with p- 0.25, 0.33,0.4, 0.6, 0.67, and 0.75. In all treatments
N- 10 and X- 3. 104 subjects participated, each presented with only one p. The subjects were
awazded according to the accuracy of their answers (see the Appendix).
We find support for the hypothesis that estimations of the compound probabilities are
centered azound the stage-by-stage probability. We call this "anchoring heuristic". This heuristic
explains the under-estimations of the compound probabilities forp ~ 0.5 and over-estimations for
p ~ 0.5.
Benartzi and Thaler [1996] investigated a similar problem from a different point of view.
In their study subjects make several choices between a certain amount and a gamble. The
choices vary in the way the gambles aze described. In some cases the gamble is descríbed as N
plays of gamble X; in other cases as an explicit distribution of possible outcomes. Benartzi and
Thaler find that subjects turn down the gamble when presented in the repeated trial format, and
accept it in the distribution format. They azgue that a partial explanation of this is that subjects
do not give neazly enough weight to the value of the repeated trials (much like in the "Law of
Small Numbers" of Kahneman and Tversky [1996]; see the book edited by Kahneman et al.,
[1982]).
In the literature on probability assessment there is extensive discussion on problems
connected with applications of Bayesian methods. Relatively little has been done about the
practical problem of assessing prior distributions. For early references, see Stael von Holstein
[1970, Chapter 10], Bar-Hillel [1973] and Wagenaaz and Sagaria [1975]. For a more recent
study, see Gneezy [1996]. The purpose of the cunent study is twofold: first to increase our
understanding of the psychological process that leads to the assessment of compound
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probabilities, and second, to use this knowledge to understand an economical phenomenon: the
equity premium puzzle.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 states the hypotheses to be tested, illustrates the
computation ofpx, and ends with describing the method used. Section 3 gives the results, and
Section 4 contains some discussion of the results.
2. Hypotheses, computation ofp~, and method
2.1 Hypotheses
A traditional assumption in finance is that even if, for bounded rationality reasons, not all
individuals estimate probabilities accurately, there are no systematic mistakes in the estimations.
So the benchmazk hypothesis we use is:
H1: The median of the individuals' estimations ispx.
Against this benchmazk hypothesis, we test the hypotheses:
H2: For a givenp, the majority of individuals over-estimatepx.
H3: For a givenp, the majority of individuals under-estimate px.
Finally, we test the anchoring hypothesis:
H4: T'he median of the answers is the stage-by-stage probabilityp.
2.2 Computation ofpx
To calculate px we define the transitionprobability matriz P with elements p~:
P-[p;l], ij-1,2,...,XfNf 1,
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If we define q- 1- p, then P can be written as
0
q 0 p
0 ... q 0
Note that it is enough to have X f N f 1 rows, since after N stages the stock can be worth at
most á (X f N). The probabilities of reaching a value of~j (j - 0, ..., X t N) after N stages,
when the starting amount is equal to SX, can be found in the (X f 1)-th row of Q-[q;~J - P'v.
Finally, the px is then calculated by
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2.3 Method
We fixed X- 3 and had 6 treatments, with the stage-by-stage probability (p) of 0.25,
0.33, 0.40, 0.60, 0.67, 0.75 in treatment 1, ..., 6 respectively. Altogether 104 subjects
participated: 18, 15, 18, 17, 18, 18 in treatment 1,. .., 6 respectively. Subjects were first yeaz
students in economics at the second semester of their studies. Most of them had participated
successfully in a basic statistics course. After a short introduction, subjects received the
instruction (see the Appendix for the instructions for treatment 1). The answers of subjects were
evaluated and rewazded as described in the instructions. The experiment took 20 minutes
(excluding the paying time).
3. Results
The answers given by the subjects aze presented in Table 1. We first test the benchmazk
hypothesis (H1). It is not wise to use a test based upon the mean of the observations, since this
test will be very sensitive to outliers (in particulaz with this kind of number of observations, see
e.g. Hampel et al. [1986]). A sign test is an alternative.2 Under H1 the number of individuals
that under-estimates should equal the number of individuals that over-estimates the compound
probability px. From Table 2 we can see that hypothesis H1 is rejected for p- 0.25, 0.67, and
0.75, and is not rejected for p- 0.33, 0.40, and 0.60 (we reject H1 when one of the two
probabilities is lower than 2.So~o).3 We should note that for p- 0.25 there aze some
(unreasonable) high answers. If we drop these observations from the analysis, the number of
Z Under the null hypothesis, the number of respondents that under-estimates p, follows a binomial distribution
B(n, q) with parameters n equal to the number ofobservations and q equal to .5.
3 Forp- 0.25 one respondent gave the exact answer. In that case the test is based upon the answers
different from p~ (conditional sign test).
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under-estimations is still lazger than the number of over-estimation, but the result is not
significant anymore.
p .25 .33 .40 .60 .67 .75
px .07 .19 .33 .78 .89 .96
tí obs. 18 15 18 17 18 18
.02 .04 .03 .35 .04 .04
.OS .OS .04 .53 .33 .50
.OS .08 .OS .55 .47 .50
.06 . ] 5 .OS .60 .50 .50
.07 .15 .13 .60 .52 .62
.10 .15 .20 .60 .60 .65
.14 .20 .24 .66 .65 .65
.15 .21 .25 .70 .65 .70
.17 .22 .35 .75 .66 .73
.19 .30 .38 .77 .67 .75
.20 .49 .40 .80 .67 .80
.25 .63 .48 .80 .68 .80
.34 .65 .53 .80 .75 .83
.85 .67 .65 .80 .80 .84
.89 .90 .65 .80 .87 .90
-90 .70 .85 .95 .90
.93 .90 .85 .97 .90
.99 .95 1.00 .99
Table 1: Data for the six different stage-by-stage probabilities; p- stage-by-stage probability and px - compound
probability.
When H1 is rejected, we then test whether H2 or H3 will be rejected. In the case ofp -
0.25, we cannot reject hypothesis H2, but hypothesis H3 is rejected. Forp - 0.67 and p- 0.75,
H2 is rejected, but H3 is not rejected (see Table 2).
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P 0.25 0.33 0.40 0.60 0.67 0.75
pX 0.07 0.19 0.33 0.78 0.89 0.96
r 4 6 8 10 15 17
P{ X5 r} 0.0245 0.304 0.407 0.834 0.999 1.000
P{ X? r} 0.994 0.849 0.760 0.315 3.77E-3 7.25E-5
Table 2: Significance probabilities corcesponding to HI (and H2 and H3). X is the number of respondents that
under-estimates p, and r is realization.
Let's now consider the hypothesis H4. Again, we use a sign test: under H4, the number
of individuals that give an answer below p equals the number of individuals that give an answer
above p. From Table 3 we see that, for all treatments, we cannot reject hypothesis H4, i.e.
estimations are centered azoundp (significance level is 2 x 2.So~o).
P 0.25 0.33 0.40 0.60 0.67 0.75
ps 0.07 0.19 0.33 0.78 0.89 0.96
r 11 10 10 3 9 9
P{ X 5 r } 0.928 0.941 0.834 0.0287 0.773 0.685
P{ X? r } 0.166 0.151 0.315 0.994 0.402 0.500
Table 3: Significance probabilities corcesponding to H4. X is the number of respondents that under-estimatesp,
and r is realízation.
In Figure 1 we graphically illustrate what we just found. The guesses ofpY are plotted
for each treatment, together with the actualpx as a function ofp.




0.25 0.33 0.4 0.6 0.67 0.75
stage-by-stage probabiliry
Figure I: Graphical representation of the guesses of px for each treatment together with the stage-by-stage
probability (p, dashed line) and the compound probability (p~, solid line). The `o' corresponds with one
observation, `t' with two, ''' with three and `x' cortesponds with five observations.
As can be seen from this figure, for p- 0.25, 0.33, and 0.40, we have px ~ p, and for p- 0.60,
0.67, and 0`.75 we have ps ~ p. Since, as shown above, estimations aze 'centered' azound p and not
around ps, it is not surprising that in cases where pX ~ p the fraction of under-estimations is
smaller than 0.5, and when px ~ p it is lazger than 0.5.
4. Discussion
Many tasks in life demand the use of heuristics, rather than explicit calculations. Some of these
heuristics aze important and very useful. However, heuristics may lead to biases in perception.
Psychologists focus on the study of these biases in order to get more insight into the way
heuristics aze formed (see the discussion in Kahneman and Tversky [1996] and Glgerenzer
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[1996]). In this paper we consider the assessment of probabilities in random walk processes. We
finger out a heuristic that is used by people in assessing compound probabilities in these kind of
set-ups, namely anchoring to the given stage-by-stage probability.4
We try to learn from the bias observed about the behavior in real financial markets. One
of the most important hypotheses that has evolved from the reseazch of financial markets, and
has been empirically investigated, is the efficient markets hypothesis. According to this
hypothesis, financial mazkets aze 'efficient', and prices should reflect a rational forecast of the
present value of future dividend payment. The efficient markets hypothesis has also been
traditionally associated with the assertion that future price changes are unpredictable, although
stock prices have a positive drift, see De Bondt and Thaler [1989, p.189]. The azbitrage forces
are supposed to guarantee that prices adjust, and then move again, randomly, in response to
unpredictable events. In a classical example, Fama [1965, p.98] writes: "It seems safe to say that
this paper has presented strong and voluminous evidence in favor of the random walk
hypothesis." Of course, this does not imply that all stocks follow the same random walk. The
future prospects of stocks may still differ. These future prospects may create different random
walk processes for different stocks. Looking N periods into the future, different processes
typically imply different probability distributions over prices. The state of the art today is the
belief that only to a first approximation, financial mazkets follow a random walk. For an
elaborate discussion of the efficient mazkets and random walk hypothesis, see De Bondt and
Thaler [1989] and Fama [1991].
4 An important observation is that although people use 'wrong' heuristics, it seems to us that in the process of
teaching students, virtually all the attention is given to developing their skills in solving problems analytically. We
believe that not enough attention is given to the development of'heuristic skill', e.g. the marginal contribution for an
MBA student of a course which tries to develop heuristic skills may be very high.
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The assumption that returns on stocks follow a random walk with positive driR, can be
compared with p~.5 in our study. If, in real mazkets, investors under-estimate the compound
probability of a stock to come up ahead after a few periods (like we show in our stylized
example), they will regard the stock as riskier than it really is. That may be a paztial explanation
of the equity premium puzzle. T'he puzzle refers to the fact that over the last century the risk-
retum relationship has been so much more favorable for stocks than for bonds, that unreasonably
high level of risk avers-ion would be needed to explain why investors aze willing to hold bonds
at all (Mehra and Prescott [1985]). Could it be the case that it is not the level of risk aversion
that is 'wrong', rather it is a case of misjudgment of risk? 5 It may be, as Arrow [1982] azgues,
that evidence of bounded rationality which is found in many cases in stylized experimental work,
may teach us about risk perception in complex financial markets. It could also be the case that,
like is commonly azgued by economists, that even when individuals make systematic mistakes
mazkets aze not biased (see e.g. Camerer [1987]). This we would like to investigate in future
research.




Welcome to our experiment in decision theory. In the experiment you will be presented with a
problem, and asked to estimate the chance of a certain outcome. The more accurate your
estimation will be, the more money you will earn. After you will finish answering we will pay
you according to the following rule:
You will start with f 20, and for every lo~o of mistake, f 1 will be deduced from your payoff. T'he
mistake is the absolute value of [your guess (in percentages) minus the actual chance].
For example, if you will guess accurately, you will get f 20. If you will make a l00~o mistake
(either over-estimate or under-estimate), you will get f 10. If your mistake will be bigger than or
equal to 200~o you will not be paid at all.
The problem is based on the following: Mr. X is given a stock that is worth f 3 today. He will
hold the stock for 10 years. In each yeaz, the price of the stock either goes up or down by f 1.
The chance of it going up is 2~3 (i.e. 670~0), and the chance of it going down is 1~3 (i.e. 330~0). So,
after the first year, the stock will be worth either f 2(with 330~o chance) or f 4(with 670~o chance).
In the second yeaz, again, the price of the stock will either go up or down by f 1, with the same
chances, and so on. If the price of the stock will reach f 0 within the 10 yeazs, then the stock will
be worthless for all future periods. Otherwise, Mr. X will sell the stock after 10 years.
The problem :
What do you think is the chance that the price of the stock after 10 years will be at
least f 3? ............. o~o
After all of you will finish answering, we will collect and check the answers, and pay you as
described above.
Do you have any questions?
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Chapter 4
Strategic Delegation: An Experimentt
Abstract: This paper examines the effects of strategic delegation in a simple ultimatum game
experiment. Our main concern is to examine the way delegation alter the way players think
about the game and play it. Specifically, we show that when the proposer uses a delegate, his
share increases. Since in such a case the proposer dces not use the delegate as a commitment
device, this effect identifies an additional explanation to the delegation phenomena. We also
show that unobserved delegation by the responder lowers his share as his delegate is perceived
to be more willing to accept tough offers. In such a case the results of the experiment is closer
to the game theoretic predíction of the ultimatum game.
~ This is a joint project with Chaim Fershtman.
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1. Introductiou:
In many types of games players, instead of playing the game themselves, prefer to send agents
that play the game on their behalf. Why do players use agents to play games? There are
several possible explanations of this phenomena. The first is that in some games, players
choose agents who have special skills that make them better players. For example, players may
send lawyers to negotiate on their behalf if the knowledge of the law may yield an advantage
in the negotiation. A second possible explanation, for the delegation phenomena, is that
players may send agents when they are under the impression that these agents are more
intelligent or more experienced than they are and therefore may play the game better than they
do. This explanation, however, relies on a bounded rationality argument in which some
players are more able than others (they can either think faster, calculate all the possible
contingencies, think about creative alternatives etc.), and where these abilities are important
for playing the game. The third explanation is that delegation may serve as a commitment
device; that is, the mere possibility of using an agent may give the player an advantage in the
game as it allows him to commit to a certain behavior. The role of delegates as a commitment
device has been coined in the literature as strategic delegation and has been extensively
discussed since Schelling (1960)z.
The main structure of a delegation game entails an additional primary stage in the game
where players may hire delegates and either give them instructions on how to play the game or
sign compensation scheme contracts which reward the delegates according to their performance.
2 For the different aspects of strategic delegation see Caillaud, 7ullien, and Picard (1995), Fershtman and Judd
(198~), Fershtman , Judd, and Kalai (1991), Fershtman and Kalai (1997), Gal-0r (1996), Green (1990), and Katz
(1991).
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1'he compensation scheme may, or may not, be publicly observable. The possibility of observing
the delegate's compensation scheme may drastically affect the outcome of the game. When the
agent's compensation scheme is observable and ineversible, it serves as a commitment device
manipulating the agent's strategic behavior and consequently the outcome of the game. The
observability assumption has drawn harsh criticism in the literature. Critics have claimed that
when the compensation schemes are not observable, delegation cannot serve as a commitment
device (see Katz (1991)).3 While the intuition of this claim may be convincing, the formal
analysis is not obvious. In a recent paper, Fershtman and Kalai (1997) analyzed simple
ultimatum games with unobserved delegation and showed the conditions under which delegation,
even when it is unobservable, may affect the outcome of the game.
In this paper we examine the effects of strategic delegation in a simple ultimatum game
experiment. Our main concern is to examine the effect of delegation on the way players think
about the game and play it.4 We therefore extend the discussion on delegation and consider
the possibility that the use of delegates, by itself, may affect the way players perceive the game
and consequently the outcome of the game.
The standard ultimatum game is a two-player game in which at the first stage, one of
the players, denoted as the Proposer, proposes a division of a given pie between himself and
the other player. At the second stage, the other player, denoted as the Responder, either
"accepts" or "rejects" the offer. Acceptance is followed by executing the division while
3 See also Dewatripoint (1988) for a discassion on the role of delegation as a commitment device when the
compensation scheme can be renegotiated.
4 The role of agency in bazgaining games was considered also by Schotter, Snyder and Zheng (1995). The main
issue in that paper was the effect of agency on the efficiency of the bazgaining. That is, do we ezpect a grater
breakdown of the bazgaing process when it is ezecuted by agenu rather than by the original players themselves.
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rejection implies that both players get no share of the pie. This type of ultimatum game has
been extensively discussed in the literature (for recent surveys see Camerer and Thaler (1995),
Guth (1995), and Roth (1995)). While theory implies that, at equilibrium, the Proposer gets all
(or almost all) of the pie, experiments show that most divisions are not so extreme and that the
average offer is typically between 30 and 50 percent, with many 50:50 splits. Moreover, low
offers (20 percent or less) are frequently rejected.
Into the above ultimatum game setup, we introduce agents that represent either the
Responder or the Proposer. We let the players provide compensation schemes (either
observable or unobservable) for the agents and then examine how the game is played and how
it differs from the ultimatum game without delegation. Thus our main focus is not on the
difference between the outcome of the experiments and the equilibria identified by the theory
but on the effects of the different types of delegation on the outcome of the ultimatum game
experiment.
Using a messenger to deliver bad messages (or, in our case, bad offers) is a commonly
observed practice. Would a Responder react identically to the same offers if made directly by
the Proposer or by the Proposer's messenger or agent? This is not a simple issue. In doing
ultimatum game experiments, the outcome usually differs from theoretical subgame perfect
equilibrium. Arguments like a taste for fair division5, norms of behavior, etc., are commonly
used in order to explain the deviation from the theoretical predictions (again, see the surveys
by Camerer and Thaler (1995), Guth (1995), and Roth (1995)). That is, the Proposer refrains
from making an "unfairM offer as he is afraid that such an offer will be rejected simply on the
5 The meaning of "fair" and "unfair" is usually exogenously given and determined by the norm of behavior in the
society. It may vary across societies, groups, genders, etc..
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basis of being unfair. However it is possible that the same Responder is willing to accept the
same offer from an agent if he knows that it is not the agent who benefits from the unfair
division and, moreover, that in punishing the Proposer for an unfair offer, the agent will also
be punished automatically. Similarly, would an agent that represents the Responder be as
sensitive as the Responder himself, to "unfair~ offers? After all there is no reason for the
agent to take such offers personally as it is the Responder who is treated unfairly.
Indeed our experiment indicates that the Proposers' payoffs are significantly higher
when they use delegates. Note that in such a game the Proposer has the ability to make "take it
or leave it" offers. Thus the advantage from using an agent is not from using it as a
commitment device, but simply because the participation of the agent in the game induces a
different behavior from the other player, i.e., the Responder. A possible explanation of this
phenomena is that the delegate's offer is more easily accepted by the Responder as the offer is
not given directly by the Proposer but by a third party. Moreover, the Responder may be less
keen to punish the Proposer since by doing so he punishes also the delegate. Given such a
behavior the Proposer optimally provides incentives to his agent to give tough offers
Our experiment indicates that unobserved delegation by the Responder reduces his
share. A possible explanation of this phenomena is that the agent is perceived to be more
willing to accept tough offers. That is, the willingness of the delegate to punish the Proposer
for an"unfair~ proposal made to a third party (the Responder) is lower than the willingness of
the Responder himself to punish for a direct unfair proposal. Since the Proposer figures this
effect in advance, he concludes that he can make a more greedy proposal with a lower risk of
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being rejected. Note that in such a case the outcome of our experiment is closer to the game
theory equilibrium of the ultimatum game.
2. Setup and design of the Delegation Game
We conducted four experimental sessions, administrated in writing, and held in regular
class rooms. In sessions 1,..,4 we had 60, 42, 51, 39 participants, respectively (192 in total).
Participants were mostly first-year economic students recruited voluntarily in their classes.
They were informed that the experiment would consist of two parts, but that they would be
informed about the instructions for the second part only after completing the first.
Part I in all sessions was a simple ultimatum game. In this game, 100 `points' were to
be divided between two players, a"Proposer" and a"Responder" 6. At the first stage of the
game, the Proposer proposed a division of the 100 points. If the Responder accepted the
division, then both players got their shares. If the Responder rejected the offer, then both
players received zero. (The instructions for part I are given in Appendix 1).
Consider now the possible use of delegates in the above ultimatum game. Delegates can
be used either by the Proposer or by the Responder7. The delegation contract may be either
observable or unobservable. Part II of the experiment (which differed across sessions)
examined the following four variations of ultimatum games with delegation.
Clearly when an experiment consists of two parts there may be some degree of learning
which takes place. While most of our conclusions are derived from comparing the second parts
6 We used points instead of money in order to have a cake of ]00. The conversion rate we used was 5 points - f
1. At the time of the ezperiment, September 1996, f 1.6-~1.
~ The possibility ezists that both the Proposer and the Responder will employ agents, but we do not consider such
a case in this paper.
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of the experiments, we also compare the outcome to the benchmark outcome from the first
part. Here it is important to point out that Guth, Schmittberger and Schwarze (1982) studied
an ultimatum game played by players who play the game twice without finding any significant
difference between the two plays (see also Roth (1995)).
Delegation by the Proooser: In the first session, hereafter PO game (observable delegation by
the Proposer), the Proposer uses a delegate to make the proposal on his behalf. An extra 20
points are available to the Proposer exclusively for use in providing an incentive scheme for
the delegate. That is, if after delegating the action and providing the incentive scheme, not all
the 20 points are paid to the delegate, none of the original players may claim the remaining
points. Under such rules, delegation is costless; the pie to be divided between the Proposer
and the Responder remains of the same size with or without delegation, which enables a
simple comparison between the different scenarios that we investigate.
The procedure for Part II of the first session is as follows: At the first stage, the
Proposer hires an Agent and signs a publicly observed compensation contract that specifies the
Agent's fee as a function of the number of points the Proposer will receive.g At the second
stage of the game, the Agent proposes a division of the 100 points and the Responder needs to
reply by "accept" or "rejectM. The final division is similar to the original ultimatum game
(Part I) wherein the delegate receives the points according to his compensation scheme, but
only if the Responder accepts the proposal (i.e., the payoff to the Agent is also contingent on
8 A variation of this problem would be to compensate the delegate on the basis of the proposal that he is making,
independently ofwhether the offer is accepted or rejected.
60 Chapter 4
whether the proposal is accepted or rejected). The instructions for this part are given in
Appendix 2.
The second session of the experiment, hereafter PN game, is the same as the PO game
but the delegate's compensation scheme in this case is not observed.
The subgame perfect equilibrium of the PO game is as follows: the Proposer provides
the Agent with the compensation scheme of paying him 20 points (or any other positive
amount) if he proposes 99 points to him and 1 point to the Responder, for any other proposal,
the delegate will receive zero points. The delegate indeed offers the division 99:1 and the
Responder accepts. The equilibrium of the PN game is the same as that of the PO game.9
Do we expect any strategic delegation in games PO and PN? According to the structure
of the game itself, the Proposer has the power to make "take it or leave it" offers. In such a
case, the possibility of using a delegate dces not benefit the Proposer. Our first hypothesis is
based on this intuition; That is, the outcome of the PO and the PN games would be the same
as the outcome in the regular ultimatum game.
The competing hypothesis is that the Proposer may benefit from the use of a delegate.
The rationale for such a hypothesis is that the Proposer may use the delegate as a shield that
allows him to ind'uectly give, by means of the delegate, bad offers. That is, if the Proposer
suggests a division in which he takes most of the points he runs the risk that the Responder
will "reject~ the proposal in order to punish him for an "unfair~ offer. It is not clear that the
Responder will react the same to an"unfair" offer that comes from a third party. Moreover, if
the Responder rejects the offer, he punishes not only the original Proposer but also the
9 One can also support the 100:0 division as a subgame perfect equilibrium.
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"innocent bystandingM agent. That is, if we accept the view that players may choose to punish
offers that are unfair, even at some cost to themselves, it is nonetheless unclear whether they
are willing to punish players who are not to be blamed. In such a case, the delegate may be
viewed as a hostage.
We do not have a specific hypothesis for the PN game as the above "hostage"
argument also holds for this case. The question is, of course, if it is possible to use the agent
as a hostage even when the contract with him is unobservable.
I?elegation by the Res nder: In the third session of the experiment, hereafter RO game, it
is the Responder who is using a delegate that will respond to the offer made by the Proposer.
The Responder may use the extra 20 points to provide the agent with an incentive scheme. The
RO game proceeds as follows: At the outset of the game, the Responder signs a publicly
observed contract with the delegate. At the second stage the Proposer, after observing the
delegate's compensation scheme, makes his proposal of the division of the 100 points. At the
last stage, the delegate either accepts or rejects the offer.
The fourth session of the experiment, hereafter BLLg~, is the same as the RO game
but in this case the delegate's compensation scheme is unobserved. That is, the Responder is
using an agent but the compensation scheme that he provides to this agent cannot be observed
by the Proposer.
Regarding the RO game, we examine the hypothesis that the use of observable
delegation, as in the PO game, affect the outcome of the game by providing an advantage for
the player who hires a delegate.
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In considering the role of observabiliry we compare the outcomes of the experiment of
the RO game with that of the RN game in order to examine three competing hypotheses. The
first one is that delegation, when it is unobservable, is in- affective and thus the outcome of the
RN game will not be significantly different from the outcome of the original ultimatum game.
This hypothesis is in the spirit of Katz (1992), who argues that in the RN game, delegation
dces not affect the outcome of the game; in particular, the Responder cannot benefit from
strategic precommitment. The (rational agent) equilibrium of this game, as suggested by Katz,
is that the Responder provides the compensation scheme: "I will give you 20 points as long as
you accept any positive offerH. The Proposer then offers the division of 99 to himself and 1
for the Responder and the delegate "accepts" such a proposal.
The second hypothesis is that the Responder may benefit from using an agent even
when the incentive scheme, provided by him, is not publicly observed. This hypothesis is in
the spirit of Fershtman and Kalai (1997), who showed that commitment via delegation may be
beneficial even when the compensation scheme is unobservable. The potential for such benefits
depends on the type of delegation (incentive versus instructive), the possibility of repetition,
and the probability of observability.
The third competing hypothesis is that the Responder will be worse off from using an
agent. That is, once the Proposer uses an agent and the incentive scheme is unobserved, the
proposals, as well as his expected payoffs, will be lowerio. In such a case the Responder is
cleazly better off without using an agent.
to We wish to delay tèe rationale for such a hypothesis to our discussion section.
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3. Results
The basic question in each of the four types of delegation games, in ow experiment, is
whether the use of a delegate changes the outcome of the game and under what circumstances a
Proposer (or Responder) may expect to benefit (or suffer) from the use of a delegate. The
outcome of ow experiment is described in Appendix 3, Table A1, in which we present all the
proposals that were made in each of the fow games, including proposals that were rejected. In
Table 1, below, we present the average proposal and the average payoffs (taking into account the
rejections) for each part of ow fow games.
PO Game PN Game RO Game RN Game
Without Agent:
Ave. Proposal 56.67 55.71 57.69 55.50
Ave. profit for Proposer 47.67 49.52 49.23 48.00
Ave. Profit for responder 38.96 40.96 39.23 42.00
With Agent:
Ave. Proposal 64.50 59.29 47.06 66.92
Ave. profit for Proposer 60.50 52.86 39.41 57.69
Ave. profit for Responder 36.50 40.00 48.82 26.93
Table 1: The average proposal and the average payoffs in the four games.
In the first part of Table 1, we present the results for the first part of the experiment, in
which players played the ultimatum game without delegation. In the second part of the table we
present the average proposal and payoffs (to both the Proposer and the Responder) in the fow
delegation games that we studied. Before elaborating on these results, it would be useful to
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describe the distribution of the proposals that were made in each variation of the delegation
game. This is done in Figure 1.













Game PO: Observed contract between the Proposer and the Agent
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Game PN: Unobservd contract between the Proposer and the Agent
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Game RO: Observed contract between the Responder and the Agent
~ Without Agent
~ With Agent
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a of points for the Proposer
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~ of points for the Proposer
Fjeure1: The disttibution of proposal that were made in each variation of the delegation game.
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Before turning to a more fomzal testing of our results, we provide a pairwise comparison
of the outcomes of the ultimatum games of the different games (see Appendix 4). Our test
indicates that there is no significant ex-ante difference between the groups.
Now we turn to test our hypothesis regarding the different effects of delegation. To do so
we compare, for each game, the outcomes of Part I(the ultimatum game) with the outcomes of
Part II (the delegated game). For comparison, we use the Mann-Whitney U test. We report the
test results in Table 2.
PO PN RO RN
Game Game Game Game
Profit-
Proposer .0119 .5007 .0455 .0682
Profit-
Responder .1273 .6616 .0483 .0326
Proposal .0349 .4588 .0254 .0224
Table 2: Mann-Whitney U tests with pairwise compazisons of the medians of outcomes in Part I and Part II of each
game. (The numbers are the probability ofa result larger than ~ z ~, where z is the test statistic).
PO Game: When the Proposer uses an agent with an observable compensation scheme,
the average proposal went up from 56.7 to 64.5 and the average payoffs to the Proposer went
up from 47.7 to 60.5 (see Table 1). Observing Table 2, it is evident that when using a delegate,
the Proposers gave significantly (at a.95 level of significance) higher proposals (a larger share to
themselves and a lower share to the Responder), and their profits were significantly higher as
well.
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PN Game: From Table 1 one can see that when the Proposer uses an agent but the compensation
scheme is unobserved, the average proposal goes up from 55.7 to 59.3 while the Proposer's
payoffs increases from 49.5 to 52.9. These changes aze in the same direction as in the PO game
but, as indicated in Table 2, these changes aze not significant.
RO Game: When the Responder uses an agent and the contract is observable, the average
proposal declines from 57.7 to 47.1, the average payoffs of the Proposer declines from 49.2 to
39.4 while the Responder's average payoffs increase from 39.2 to 48.8. From Tables 1 and 2 we
learn that the use of a delegate by the Responder significantly improves both the proposals that
he receives and his payoffs provided that the agency contract is observable.
RN Game: In the RN game, the Responder uses an agent but the agency contract is unobserved.
From Tables 1 and 2 we learn that the unobserved delegation induces significant changes in the
offers made and the payoffs received by both players. The average proposal increases from 55.5
to 66.9, the Proposer's average payoff increases from 48.0 to 57.7, while the Responder's
average payoffs decreases from 42.0 to 26.911. Surprisingly, the effect ofunobserved delegation,
in this case, is in the opposite direction than in the RO case, in which the agency contract is
observable. Thus, the use of an agent with unobserved contract makes the Responder worse off.
~ 1 One of the two rejections in Part f1 of game RN is problematia The Proposer in this observation offered a
division of60:40; the Responder offered the Agent 20 points for accepting this offer (contract 6 in Appendix Sd),
yet the Agent rejected the proposal. We report on all our observations, but note that the `spirit' of the above
discussion would not change even if we did not take this observation into account.
Strategic Delegation: An Experiment 69
4. Discussion: The different effects of delegation.
In the regular ultimatum game, it is the Proposer who has the power to make "take it or
leave it" offers, therefore, the theory suggests that he will receive all the surplus. In such a case,
there is no role for agency as a commitment device. Yet the results of our PO session indicate
that the Proposers' payoffs are significantly higher when they use agents. This result implies that
an additional explanation for the effectiveness of delegation exists. In the regular ultimatum
game, the Proposer realizes, when making his offer, that he might be punished for making an
"unfair" offer. He also understands that although the Responder is willing to punish him for an
"unfair" proposal, this willingness decreases in the presence of a delegate because punishing the
Proposer would imply punishing an"innocent" delegate as well. In other words, the Proposer
uses the delegate as a hostage. Note that indeed in the PO session, four out of 30 (i.e. 130~0)
proposals were rejected in the ultimatum game, but only one out of20 (i.e. So~o) in the game with
the agent-although the overall proposals were significantly higher in the delegated game.
In the PN game we did not identify any significant effect of delegation. Casual
observation of Figure 1 indicate an increase in the variance of the offers. We however prefer, not
to draw any specific conclusion from this part of the experiment beyond the statement that the
observability of the incentive contract changes the way players play the game.
In the RO game, it is the Responder who uses an agent. In such a case, the agent serves as
a commitment device. At the first stage of the game, the Responder signs an observable
compensation scheme with the agent, which allows him to commit not to accept certain offers.
Our experiment indicates that the Responder benefits from the delegation and his expected
payoffs increase significantly.
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We find the outcome of the RN pazt of the experiment the most surprising. For this pazt,
we identified initially three competing hypothesis. The first one is that RN delegation does not
affect the outcome of the game. The Responder cannot use the agent as a commitment device
because the incentive contract is not observable. The second hypothesis is that even without
observability there is some commitment value in delegation; therefore, the Responder will
benefit from the use of agents. We found out that we can reject these two hypothesis and that, to
our surprise, the Responder should expect to end up worse off from using an agent with
unobserved contract. The explanation we suggest for this result is that the willingness of the
delegate to punish the Proposer for an"unfair" proposal made to a thirdparty (the Responder) is
lower than the willingness of the original Responder to punish for a direct unfair proposal.
Moreover, the Proposer figures this effect in advance, and concludes that he can make a more
greedy proposal with a lower risk ofbeing rejected.
The above result is in contrast to Katz (1991) and Fershtman and Kalai (1997). Katz
(1991) azgues that the use of a delegate with an unobserved contract will not influence the
outcome of the gazne (i.e., the outcomes will be similaz to those of the ultimatum game).
Fershtman and Kalai (1997) predict that, in many cases, the use of a delegate influences
bazgaining even if the contract is unobserved, and thus the effect of some delegations is in the
direction of the RO prediction.
Note that while our experiment examines a game with unobserved delegation, it cannot
be viewed as an experiment that evaluates the different claims of Katz (1991) and Fershtman
and Kalai (1997). It has already been well established that the outcome of ultimatum
bargaining experiments differs from the theoretical subgame perfect equilibrium of this game.
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Thus, observing a difference in the outcomes of the RO and the RN games may be due to the
frequently observed deviation of these experiments from the equilibrium prescribed by game
theory rather than an indication of the theoretical role of unobserved delegation. To our
opinion, the contribution of the experiments that compare the outcomes of the RO and RN
games with the original ultimatum game without delegation is to see to what degree the use of
delegation is helpful and whether players take advantage of strategic delegation even when it is
unobservable.
Comparing the incentive contracts provided in the RO game and in the RN game
indicates that the Responder indeed understands the role of delegation as a commitment device.
In the RO game the Responders provided an "aggressiveH incentive contracts. Observe that the
median value for which he is giving all the 20 points to the agent is the amount of 80 to the
Responder. In the unobserved case the Responder realizes that the unobservability implies that
agency dces not have a commitment value, and the median value for the agent to receive all
the 20 points decreased to 20 (see the table in Appendix Sd).
5. Concluding Remark.
In this paper, we have described an experiment designed to analyze the effect of
delegation on the outcomes of ultimatum games. The main conclusion of this experiment is that
delegation significantly changes the outcome of the gazne. Beyond the standazd explanations of
strategic delegation, our experiment suggests that the introduction of an additional player, the
agent in our case, changes the players' perceptions regarding the norm of behavior and what
constitute a fair division in the game they aze playing. These suggestions may be extended
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beyond the scope of ultimatum games and delegation. There aze many games in which the
strategic interaction may determine the entrance of a new player into the game; for example, in
mazket games in which entry deterrence is possible and the firms' actions may affect the
possibility of entrance. In such cases, changes in the set of players may affect the players'
perception about the (fair) norm of behavior or other behavioral rules that the players prefer to
obey. Such perceptions affect the way that these type of games aze played, and therefore
changing these perception should be discussed in a strategic context.
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Appendix 1: The introduction and instructions for part I
Introduction
The instructions are simple, and if you follow them carefully you may earn a considerable
amount of money that will be paid to you in cash at the end of the experiment. 60 students
participate in this experiment. Each of you is about to get an envelope with a number. This is
your registration number. Please look at it and then put it back in the envelope without letting
anyone else see it. At the end of the experiment you will be asked to show the registration
number you have in the envelope to the experimenter, and he will pay you according to your
performance. Do not forget to write your registration number on all the fonns that you will get.
The experiment consists of two parts.
Instructions for part I
In this part, 100 points are to be divided between two persons: the "Proposer" and the
"Responder". At the end of the experiment, each of the two persons will get 20 cents for each
point he will have.
A proposal about how to divide the 100 points between the two persons is made by the Proposer.
Upon receiving the proposal the Responder is asked to respond by either accepting or rejecting it.
(a) If the Responder accepts the proposal, then both he and the Proposer are paid
according to the proposal.
(b) If the Responder rejects the proposal, then both persons are paid 0 points.
The procedure for Part I is as follows: 30 students will be selected randomly to play the role of
the Proposer in this part. Each Proposer will get a form on which he is asked to indicate his
proposal to the Responder. The proposal must be in multiples of 10 (0, 10 , 20, 30, etc.). For
example, either 0 to the responder and 100 to the proposer, or 10 to the responder and 90 to the
proposer, etc.
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After the Proposers will make their choice we will collect all the forms in a box, and let each of
the 30 Responders students to pick randomly one form out of the box. The Responder will not be
able to know what is written on the form before choosing it, and will never know the identity of
the Proposer with whom he was matched (he will only know the registration number of that
person). The Responder is asked to indicate on the form whether he accepts or rejects the
proposal. We will collect the forms and write down the payment for each student for this part
(using the registration numbers). Then part II will start. You will get the instructions for part II
after part I will be over.
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Appendix 2: The instructions for part II ofgame PO
Instructions for part II
This part is similaz to part I, but this time the Proposer can not make the proposal himself.
Instead, the Proposer must hire an"Agent" to make the proposal on his behalf First, each
Proposer will write a contract with an Agent. The Agent will see the contract before deciding
how much to propose to the Responder. After the Agent will make the proposal the Responder
will see both the proposal and the contract between the Proposer and the Agent. Then, the
Responder will be asked to decide whether to accept or reject the proposal.
In order to pay the Agent, the Proposer gets 20 points (which he can use only to pay the Agent).
If the Proposer offers the Agent less than 20 points, then the rest of the points are lost.
The procedure for Part II is as follows: 20 students will be selected randomly to play the role of
the Proposer in this part. Each of them will get a form with the following table
Payment from the Proposer to the Agent
t~ points for the
Proposer
t! points to the Agent
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
In each column the Proposer is asked to write how much to pay the Agent if he gets for him the
corresponding number of points. That is, if according to the agents proposal this amount of
points will be given to the Proposer. For example, in the column of 90, the Proposer is asked to
write how much to pay the Agent if he gets for him 90 points, etc. After all the Proposers will fill
out this table on the fonn, we will collect the forms in a box.
We will then select randomly 20 students out of the remaining 40 to play the role of the Agent.
Each Agent will pick randomly one fonn out of the box, and observe the table that the Proposer
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he is matched with made. The Agent is now asked to make a proposal to the Responder. The
forms will be collected again in the box.
Each of the remaining 20 students will be a Responder. Each will randomly pick one fon~t out of
the box and observe both the Agent's payment table and the proposal made by the Agent. Then
he is asked to decide whether to accept or reject the proposal. The Responder is asked to indicate
his choice on the form.
To summaries, the procedure is as follows:
The Proposer ~ The Agent --i The Responder
Writes a contract with Observes the contract and Observes both the contract and
the Agent makes a proposal the proposal and decides whether
to accept or reject the proposal
Remarks:
(a) The payment from the Proposer to the Agent does not have to be in multiples of 10.
(b) If the proposal that the Agent makes is rejected, then all persons, including the Agent, get 0
points for Part II.
We will then collect all the forms, find out how much money each of you earned in Part I and
Part II, and pay each of you privately. This will end the experiment. If you have any question
please raise your hand and one of the experimenters will come to you.
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Appendix 3: The Proposals
PO Game PN Game RO Game RN Game
Without With Without With Without With Without With
i,` Agent Agent Agent Agent Agent Agent Agent Agent
1 80' 90 80 90' 90" 70" 90' 90
2 80 90 70" 80 70" 60' 80 80
3 70' 80' 70 70 70 60 70 80
4 70 80 60` 70 70 60 60` 80
5 70 70 60 70 70 60 60 70
6 60` 70 60 60 70 50 60 70
7 60` 70 60 60 70 50 60 70
8 60 70 60 60 60' S0 60 60"
9 60 60 60 50 60 50 60 60`
10 60 60 60 50 60 50 50 60
11 60 60 50 50 60 50 50 60
12 60 60 50 50 60 40 50 50
13 60 60 50 40 60 40 50 40
14 60 60 50 30 60 30 50
15 60 60 50 60 30 50
16 50 50 50 50 30 50
17 50 50 50 50 20 50
18 50 50 50 50 50
19 50 50 50 50 30
20 50 50 40 50 30











Proposer 47.67 60.5 49.52 52.86 49.23 39.41 48 57.69
Ave. profit
Responder 38.96 36.5 40.96 40 39.23 48.82 42 26.93
Average
proposal 56.67 64.5 55.71 59.29 57.69 47.06 55.5 66.92
Table Al: The Proposals made by subjects. The proposals that were rejected are with a'.
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A~pend~ 4: Comparing th~popnlation 'n the fot:r games.
We use the nonparametric Mann-Whitney U test based on ranks in order to test whether the
samples of the outcomes come from populations having the same median. This is the appropriate
test because the distributions are not normal. We report the test results in Table A2.
Game Game Game Game Game Game
1 and 2 I and 3 1 and 4 2 and 3 2 and 4 3 and 4
Profit-
Proposer . 8934 .6873 .9526 . 8139 .8449 .6657
Profit-
Responder .7449 .8630 .9842 .6378 .7543 .8767
Proposal .7814 .7116 .7215 .5562 . 9169 .5062
Table A2: Mann-Whimey U tests with pairwise comparisons of the medians ofoutcomes in the ultimatum game by
sessions. (The numbers are the probability ofa result larger than ~ z ~, where z is the test statistic).
From Table A2 we learn that, with a.95 level of significance (actually, even at .5 level of
significance) we cannot reject the hypothesis that each of the two samples compared aze from
populations with the same median.
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Proposer 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
1 0 10 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
2 0 5 10 15 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
3 0 0 10 15 20 20 20 15 15 10 10
4 0 5 10 15 18 20 18 0 0 0 0
5 0 0 0 5 10 20 15 10 5 0 0
6 0 0 0 0 0 15 20 10 0 0 0
7 0 0 5 5 10 10 20 10 0 0 0
S 0 0 5 5 5 10 10 20 20 20 20
9 0 0 0 0 0 10 15 20 0 0 0
10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 20 0 0 0
11 0 2 4 6 10 15 18 19 20 20 20
12 0 2 4 6 8 14 16 18 20 20 20
13 0 2 4 6 8 10 15 18 20 20 20
14 0 2 4 6 10 12 15 17 20 20 20
15 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 15 20 20 20
16 0 0 0 5 5 5 10 15 20 20 15
17 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 20
18 2 8 5 7 0 19 13 16 0 2 3
19 8 8 10 10 11 14 14 15 15 18 18
20 9 5 0 7 8 4 3 10 15 9 3





0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
1 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
2 0 5 10 15 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
3 0 3 9 15 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
4 0 8 10 12 18 20 20 20 20 20 20
5 0 4 8 12 16 20 16 12 8 4 0
6 0 0 5 5 15 18 20 5 5 0 0
7 0 5 8 10 12 15 20 20 20 20 20
8 0 0 0 0 5 10 20 20 20 20 20
9 0 3 7 10 13 15 19 20 20 20 20
10 0 0 0 8 10 IS 18 20 10 10 10
11 0 0 5 5 10 10 15 20 20 20 20
12 0 0 0 0 5 10 15 20 20 20 20
13 0 2 4 5 6 8 10 15 20 20 20
14 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
Appendix Sb: The contracts of game PN.
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Amount
forthe
Responder 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
1 5 10 15 20 10 5 10 15 0 10 20
2 0 5 10 15 18 20 20 20 20 20 20
3 0 5 10 10 15 15 20 20 20 20 20
4 0 0 0 0 0 0 20 20 20 20 20
5 0 1 1 2 2 5 5 20 2 1 0
6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 20 20 20 20
7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 20 20 20 20
8 0 0 4 6 10 10 16 18 20 20 20
9 0 1 4 10 13 14 15 15 20 20 20
10 0 0 0 0 0 5 10 15 20 20 20
11 0 12 15 15 16 16 18 18 19 20 20
12 0 2 5 10 10 15 15 15 15 20 20
13 0 3 4 5 11 12 14 17 18 19 20
14 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
15 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
16 0 15 15 15 15 IS 15 15 15 15 20
17 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 5 10 15 20





0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
1 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
2 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
3 0 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
4 0 10 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
5 0 10 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
6 0 5 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
7 0 0 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
8 0 0 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
9 0 0 0 0 0 20 0 0 0 0 0
10 0 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
11 0 2 4 16 18 19 12 14 16 18 20
12 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
13 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
Appendix Sd: The contracts of game RN.
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Chapter 5
On Competing Rewards Standards~
-An Experimental Study of Ultimatum Bargaining-
Abstract: In the tradition of eazlier experimental studies, this paper introduces competing
rewazd standazds by letting parties bazgain over the distribution of chips. The monetary
equivalents of a chip for the bazgaining parties can be equal (no competing rewazds) or different
(competing rewards). The ultimatum game is used as a tool to learn about rewazd standards in an
asymmetric procedure. A major effect of different monetary chip equivalents is observed only
when the proposer has a higher chip value. Results aze compazed to those reported in Kagel et al.
(1996), who used a different experimental design.
~ This is a joint project with Werner Guth.
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1. Introduction
Rewards standards measure how people perceive their success when performing a certain task. In
interactive situations, such reward standards usually rely on commonly accepted views on what
constitutes a rewazd and how to measure individual rewards. In experiments, competing rewazd
standards can be easily introduced by allowing parties to bazgain over the distribution of chips
whose monetary equivalent (that is, the value of a chip) varies for different individuals. (See
Nydegger and Owen, 1974, for an eazly application.) The two competing rewards aze then the
amount of chips that an individual receives, and the monetary earning implied by the chips
assignment.
The original motivation for using this experimental method was to test experimentally
basic axioms of game theoretic concepts (see Nydegger and Owen, 1974, and Roth and
Murnighan, 1982, who were mainly interested in testing the independence of bazgaining results
with respect to affine utility transformations as required, for instance, by Nash, 1953). Since
changing the positive monetary chip value actually amounts to a positive affine utility
transformation, this change does not affect the game theoretic prediction (relying on such
axioms). In this research tradition, competing rewazd standazds aze a convenient experimental
method to challenge the empirical validity of a certain rationality requirement.
According to the hierazchical structure of the chips eamings versus the monetary
eamings, equity theory (see Homans, 1961, for an eazly reference) would predict equal chip
assignments when the monetary value of chips for individuals aze not common knowledge. On
the other hand, it predicts that monetary earnings will be equalized when values are commonly
known, i.e. when the superior reward standazd of monetary earnings is applicable (see Guth,
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1988, and 1994). This has been demonstrated most clearly by Nydegger and Owen (1974) and
subsequently by Roth and Malouf (1979). See Roth (1995) for a more comprehensive survey.
Whereas the above-mentioned studies were concerned with symmetric bargaining, e.g.
the demand game of Nash (1953), the experiment reported in this paper has used the extremely
asymmetric ultimatum game. In the ultimatum game, player 1(the "proposer") first proposes
how to split the total amount of chips. Then player 2(the "responder") decides whether to accept
or reject this proposal. If the responder accepts, then the proposal is implemented; otherwise,
both players receive nothing. For players motivated purely by monetary considerations, the game
theoretic solution implies that the proposer receives almost all the money. This is not the
observed outcome in experimerrts. The deviation is usually attributed to "fairness"
considerations.
Testing fairness in asymmetric bargaining games should not be perceived as a test of
equity theory, since it is not claimed that equity considerations dominate all other, e.g. strategic
considerations. What we therefore try to explore experimentally is the trade-off between fairness
and strategic considerations. Moreover, the structure of the ultimatum game is such that players
may develop different fairness standazds depending on their role. We can thus explore whether
and how relative strategic advantages will influence the standazd on which one relies.
Kagel, Kim, and Moser (1996) (hereafter KKM) have also used the ultimatum game as a
tool to study this phenomena. Since the KKM study is closely related to the study in this paper, it
will be discussed in more detail below.
We report here the results of three different treatments: In treatment (2,1), the value of a
chip for player 1 was twice its value for player 2; in treatment (1,1), they had a common value; in
treatment (1,2), the value of a chip for player 2 was twice its value for player 1.
88 Chapter 5
In treatment (2,1), player 1 may consider an equal chip split as"fair" since it gives him a
higher rewazd. On the other hand, the responder may consider an equal money split as "fair", and
for that reason be likely to reject an equal chip split which he conceives as unfair proposals. In
the regular ultimatum game, the proposer, on average, typically claims a bit more than SOo~o of
the cake (again, see the survey by Roth, 1995). In our case, the proposers claim a bit less in terms
of the chips, but a much lazger shaze of the money. We conclude that the average proposal is
more in line with the equal chip split than the money split in this case. In treatment ( I,1), both
the equal chip split and the equal money split coincide. Our results in this case are in line with
what is usually observed. The proposers claim a bit more than SOa~o of the cake. In treatment
(1,2), player 1 is expected to favor an equal money split to an equal chip split. However, our
result does not support this. In fact, proposals aze not significantly different from the proposals of
treatment (1,1).
2. Experimental procedure
Before going on to elaborate on our own procedure, will first describe the KKM procedure. In
the KKM study, unequal chip equivalents could favor either the proposer or the responder (~0.10
or á0.30 per chip). The total amount of chips to be allocated was 100, and only unequal chip
value was tested. Furthermore, they vazied the information about the monetazy chip value of the
other party (own-chip values were always known). Participants in the KKM experiment played
the ultimatum game in the same role (proposer or responder) ten times with different partners,
learning only about their own plays. One of the ten successive plays was then finally selected by
chance for actual payment.
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In the current study, we focused on the "full infonnation" condition. That is, the
conversion rates were commonly known. The reason is the interest in the hierazchy of reward
standazds. We find some of the results obtained by KKM for this condition striking:
(i) High rejection rates (390~0 of all proposals in the case when the proposer has the higher
value).
(ii) Proposers for the most part refrained from proposing equal earnings when they had the
higher value per chip.
(iii) When the proposers had the lower value per chip, their mean proposals were consistent
with the equal-earnings prediction.
The rejection rates are quite high compared with other experiments (see Roth 1995).
Tendencies (ii) and (iii) imply that proposers apply the superior reward standard when this is in
their own advantage.2 The current experiment was conducted to test the robustness of these result
with respect to the procedure.
We had three treatments, with 100 chips to be divided in each game. In treatment (2,1),
the value of a chip was 0.4 Guilders for the proposer and 0.2 Guilders for the responder. In
treatment (1,1) the value of a chip was 0.2 Guilders for each player, and in treatment (1,2) it was
0.2 for the proposer and 0.4 Guilders for the responder. The value of the chips was commonly
known in all treatments. The game was played only once.3
z Such a behavioral tendency is in contrast to the politeness ritual, observed in reward allocation experiments
(Shap'vo, 1975).
3 We were interested in testing whether results (ii) and (iii) are robust for higher monetary incentives. To guarantee
this, participants played only once (see footnote 4 ofKKM, which acknowledges this problem). The value of the pie
was about á 18 in our experiment, compared with ~20I10-á2 in the KKM experiment.
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Compazed with KKM, we have therefore used less dramatic differences in monetary chip
equivalents and included a treatment with equal equivalents, which enables us to compare our
results to other studies of ultimatum games. Moreover, our participants played only once in order
to increase the monetary incentives.
The pazticipants in the experiment were undergraduate students in economics at the
University of Tilburg. Students were recruited in classes. Each treatment was conducted with a
different group ofparticipants. The instructions they were given are presented in Appendix A.
3. Results
The result of the plays (16, 14, and 15 in treatment (2,1), (1,1), and (1,2) respectively) are
presented in Appendix B. We use the nonpazametric Mann-Whitney U-test based on ranks to test
the following two hypotheses:
1. The distribution ofchips is not affected by the different treatments, and
2. The distribution ofmoney is not affected by the different treatments.
The results are presented in Table 1.
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(2,l) and (l,l) í2,1) and (1,2) (~,l) and (1,2)
Chips-split .OS' .02' .95
Money-split .00' .00' .95
Table 1: Pairwise comparisons of the distribution of chips and money for the different treatments. The numbers in
the table are thep-values. 'indicates significant differenes.
We cannot reject the hypothesis that the chip-split, as well as the money-split, in
treatments (1,1) and (b1,2) comes from distributions with the same mean. Both these hypotheses
are rejected, however, when we compaze treatment (2,1) to the other two treatments: Proposers in
treatment (2,1) asked significantly less chips for themselves than in the other treatments, but
significantly more money. These comparisons are presented in Figures la and lb.
Note that equal earnings would require
-the (33, 67) or (34, 66)-chip assignment for treatment (2,1)
-the (50, 50)-chip assignment for treatment (1,1)
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Figures 1 a and 1 b: Compazisons of of chips split and money split according to treatments.
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Treatment 2,1 ],1 1,2 All
Hit rate of basic reward standard 0 of 16 7 of 14 6 of 15 13 of 45
(chips)
(Ooro) (50"ro) (40oIo) (29"Io)
Hit rate of superior reward standard 4 of 16 7 of 14 6 of 15 17 of 45
(money) (25oro) (50"ro) (40oIo) (38oro)
Hit rate of equity theory in general 4 of 16 7 of 14 12 of 15 23 of 45
(25"ro) (SOoIo) (80"ro) (Slo~o)
Table 1: Hit rates ofproposals in line with the basic and superior reward standard and ofequity theory in general (a
hit is given when the observations deviates by 5 chips or less from the prediction).
The hit rate of equal earnings is 250~0, SOo~o, and 400~o for treatment (2,1), (1,1), and (1,2),
respectively. For the basic chip standard it is 0"~o for treatment (2,1) and 40"~o for treatment (1,2).
Finally, only Slo~o of all observations can be justified by equity considerations.4
Remember, however, that this does not question the validity of equity theory: In the
asymmetric ultimatum game equity considerations and strategic aspects are conflicting.
However, it is interesting to observe whether behavior deviates from that implied by strategic
aspects toward a more equitable results (as is partly true for the KKM data).
Comparing our results with those of the KKM study, we observed a dramatically lower
rejection rate (overall less than 90~0). The equal eatning result (iii) is also rejected by our data.
The only consistent observation is their tendency (ii) stating that most proposers with larger chip
equivalent refrain from granting equal earnings, but try to stay close to the 50:50-chip
4 A standazd test of equity theory is not obvious, since, without allowing for any error or noise, any violation would
reject it. One possibility would be to specify alternative hypotheses, e.g. the one of uniformly distributed proposals
over some range, and to test their relative success. Here we do not engage in such an attempt.
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distribution. Counting earning differences smaller than or equal to 5 chips as equal, 5 of the 16
proposers in the (2,1)-treatment aimed at equal earnings, as compared to 7 out of 14 in the (1,1)-
treatment and 5 out of 15 in the (1,2)-treatment. Thus, it is not so much the share of proposers
aiming at equal earnings which differs, but more the direction and size of the deviations.
A double ultimatum hypothesis claiming that the proposer cannot only dictate the chip
allocation, but also the reward standard would have predicted the 50:50 or a neazby chip
allocation in the case of (2,1) and the 67:33 allocation in the (1,2) treatment as the equitable
benchmazk. Whereas in the second case the predictive success of this equitable benchmazk
(allowing for deviations greater than or equal to 5 chips) is 400~0, no 50:50 or nearby allocations
has been observed for the (2,1) treatment: six proposers took considerably more and ten
considerably less than 50 chips.
Another way to describe the different results for the (2,1) and the (1,2) treatment is to
distinguish between three groups ofparticipants: Those who ask for (at least ten chips) more than
50 chips, those who ask for less than 50 chips, and those who allocate the chips evenly.
According to Table 2, the group of 50:50 proposers is lazgest for treatment (1,1), still substantial
in treatment (1,2), but non-existent for treatment (2,1). Thus, the more basic chip-standard is
completely ruled out when it would favor the responder: If proposers caze for fair rewazds, they
invariably rely on the superior rewards of monetary earnings. If they do not, they try to exploit
their ultimatum power by asking for even more than 50 chips.
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Proposer's demand
Treatment Less than 50 50 More than 50
2,1 10 0 6
1,1, I 8 5
l,2 2 6 7
Table 2: Proposers demand freaquencies.
4. Discussion
Our results aze quite different from those reported in KKM. First, we observe dramatically lower
rejection rates. Second, we cannot confirm their observation that proposers aim at equal earnings
when their monetary chip equivalent is smaller than the one of the responders.
What details in the experimental procedure could have caused these differences?5 Unlike
their counterpazts in the KKM study, the participants in the current experiment played only once;
leanting effects may thus be different. However, hardly any learning effects are visible in the
KKM data (see their Figure 1 on p.104).
The two aspects that we believe make the difference aze, first, the less extreme
asymmetry in chip equivalents, and second, the salience of monetary incentives (S18 instead of
~2 per game). For example, if the responder's chip equivalent is only one third of the proposers's
value, and only one out of ten games is paid, it may seem "less costly" and thus "more attractive"
for the responder to reject a 50:50 chip allocation which denies the superior reward standard,
than would be the case in our procedure.
5 We would like to emphasis that KKM were interested in the role of information, which influenced their choice of
procedure.
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The KKM results and our observations together may provide a more complete picture to
understand reward standazds of asymmetric bargaining situations.
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Appendix A: Instructions~Decision Forms
Instructions for the Proposer
Welcome to this experiment in decision making. Soon you will be randomly matched with
another student. In the experiment, 100 points is to be divided between yourself and the other
student. You aze called the Proposer and helshe is called the Responder.
We will ask you to make a proposal about how to divide the 100 points between yourself
and the Responder. Then we will ask the Responder to decide whether to "accept" or "reject"
your proposal.
(a) If the Responder accepts the proposal, then each of you will earn points according to
the proposal you made.
(b) If the Responder rejects the proposal, then neither ofyou will earn any points at all.
At the end of the experiment you (the Proposer) will receive 20 cents for each point you
have. The Responder will receive 40 cents for each point helshe has. That is, helshe will receive
twice the amount ofmoney for each point held.
If you have no questions, please write down your ANR number and your proposal.
Your ANR number:
Your Proposal:
~ of points for the Proposer (you): ~ ofpoints for the Responder:
Please note that the numbers in the two boxes should add up to 100.
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Instructions for the Responder
Welcome to this experiment in decision making. Soon you will be randomly matched with
another student. In the experiment, ] 00 points is to be divided between yourself and the other
student. You are called the Responder and he~she is called the Proposer.
We asked the Proposer to make a proposal about how to divide the 100 points between
him~herself and you. Now we ask you to decide whether to "accept" or "reject" hislher proposal.
(a) If you accepts the proposal, then each of you will earn points according to the
proposal made.
(b) If you rejects the proposal, then neither of you will earn any points at all.
The Proposer received similar instructions to yours. At the end of the experiment the
Proposer will receive 20 cents for each point he~she has. You will receive 40 cents for each point
you have. That is, you will receive twice the amount of money for each point held.
If you have no questions, please write down your ANR number and whether you accept
or reject the proposal written below.
Your ANR number:
The Proposal made by the Proposer:
~ ofpoints for the Proposer: ~of points for the Responder (you):
Your decision (please write accept or reject):
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Appendix B: The Proposals
2,1 1,1 1,2
Proposals Proposals Proposals
1 75' 99' 70'
2 65 85 67
3 60' 66 66
4 60 60 66
5 60 60 65
6 60 55 65
7 40 51 60
8 40 50 50
9 40 50 50
10 40 50 50
11 40 50 50
12 35 50 50
] 3 33.3 50 50
14 33.3 50 40
15 33.3 30
16 32
Average 46.7 58.3 55.3
T'he proposals (in chips). ' indicates proposals that were rejected.
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Chapter 6
Efficiency, Reciprocity, and Expectations in an
Experimental Game~
Abstract: In an experimental 2-player game player 1 chooses to take x(Dutch guilders), in
which case player 2 gets 0, or to leave the money. In the latter case payoffs are determined by
player 2, who chooses how to split 20 between the players. The parameter x is varied between
treatments, taking values of4, 7, 10, 13, and 16 guilders.
The number ofplayers choosing to leave the money is declining in x. When x is equal to
4,7, or 10 guilders many players 2 choose to allocate y to player 1 such that y?x. There is no
positive correlation between x and y. Independently of x, the choices of player 2 resemble the
choices made in an experimental Dictator game. We explicitly measure the players' beliefs.
When x-7, 10, or 13 many players 1 choose to leave x despite expecting to get back less than x.
There is a positive correlation between y and 2's expectation of 1's expectation ofy.
~ This is a joint project with Martin Dufwenberg.
104 Chapter 6
1. Introduction
Suppose you find a wallet in the street. No one sees you. The wallet contains money, and some
other stuff which is of appazent value to the owner but of no use to you. You can either keep the
wallet, or bring it to a nearby police station for the owner to pick up. The police will routinely
register your name, and subsequently ask the wallet owner to reimburse you in the amount he
considers appropriate. What would you do?
It is commonly assumed in economics that people aze motivated only by material, self-
centered concems. In the above situation such an assumption leads to an inefficient outcome. T'he
owner will not reimburse the finder if he picks his wallet up at the police station. The finder
figures this out and simply keeps the wallet. Both these persons would prefer that the owner gets
back the wallet and reimburses the finder sufficiently.
A special instance of this situation is modeled in the game I'(x) in Fig. 1, where payoffs
aze in Dutch guilders (J), x is an exogenously given parameter such that OcxQO, and y is chosen
by player 2 such that 05yS20.
Y
20y Figure 1: The game I'(x)
If the players aze motivated solely by personal monetary gain, the unique subgame perfect
equilibrium in I'(x) is (Take, ,y~0), corresponding to the dismal outcome with the lost wallet. This
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outcome is inefficient since if 1 chooses Leave and 2 chooses y such that x~yQO, then a payoff
vector will be realized which is better for both players.
However, much experimental evidence suggests that when humans ínteract they may be
motivated by various non-material considerations and not only personal monetary gain. In some
cases this may eliminate inefficiency. We address related issues by investigating the nature of
strategic behavior in an experímental game which resembles I'(x). However, for methodological
reasons, we ask player 2 to report a strategv a choice of y-without informing her about 1's
choice.z We still refer to the experimental game as I'(x).
We use x as a treatment variable taking values of j4, 7, 10, 13, and 16.3 As in I'(x), the
money pie to be split by player 2 is held fixed at j20 in all treatments. We let participants engage
in anonymous, one-shot plays of this experimental game. Our objective is to record regulazities
in the participants decision making and to draw conclusions about the motivations behind the
their behavior. To shed some additional light on this, we explicitly measure some of the players'
beliefs about one another's actions and beliefs by asking the participants to make certain guesses
about other participants' choices or guesses, rewazding them for accuracy.
We investigate the following issues which relate to the treatment variable x:
Z 1'he strategy approach, which goes back to Selten (1967), has the advantage that we can record 2's behavior
irrespective ofwhether her information set is reached. However, 2 is not faced with the fait accompli of 1 choosing
Leave, and this may affect her behavior. We take the experimental evidence reported by Schotter, Weigelt 8r Wilson
(1994) to be indicative that this may be important (cf their findings for the games 1M, 1S, and 1H, which have
similarities with I'(x)). Since Schotter et al used matrices or graphs to describe their experimental games to
participants while we use words only, it is not quite cleaz what effect to expect though. We do not explore the issue
here. See Roth (1995, pp 322-3) for a discussion of the strategy method.
3 At the time of the experiment 20 Dutch guilder was worth approximately 12 US dollars.
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~ An efficient outcome obtains if and only if player 1 chooses Leave. However, if 1 chooses
Leave his potential loss is increasing in x. Is the propensity for 1 to choose Leave negatively
correlated with x?
. By choosing Leave, player 1 places a trust in 2. To what extent does 2 reciprocate and keep
this trust by choosing y~`?'
. One might argue that the higher is x, the kinder is 1 by choosing Leave since the potential
loss he may incur by doing so is higher. 2 may want to be kind in return by conespondingly
choosing a highery. Is y positively correlated with x?
Furthennore, we investigate the following issues which relate to the players' beliefs:
. Is there a connection between 1's expectation of y and 1's propensity to choose Leave? In
particular, does 1 choose Leave only ifhe expects to get back at least x?
. Is player 2's choice of y positively correlated with her expectation of 1's expectation of y
(conditional on 1 choosing Leave)? This could happen for example if 2 were averse to
"letting 1 down", in the sense of not wanting to choose y below 1's expectation of y.
However, since player 2 does not know 1's expectation ofy, it may be that the higher is her
expectation of 1's expectation ofy, the higher she may be inclined to choose y.
I'(z) is related to the Dictator game in which one player decides how to divide f 20 between
himself and another (dummy) player. The subgame of I'(x) where 2 moves, considered in
4 The usage of the terminology "place a trust", "keep the trust", and "reciprocate" here is in line with that of Berg,
Dickhaut 8c McCabe (1995, p 126) who study a game (further discussed below) which is related to ours.
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isolation, has precisely such a structure.s When the Dictator game is tested experimentally, with
monetary payoffs controlled, "the dictator" quite often gives away more than zero, which is
typically explained with reference to altruism or fairness considerations (see Davis 8c Holt 1993,
pp 263-9 for a discussion). We suspect that 2's behavior in ï'(x) will be affected by similaz
concerns, but that in addition it may matter that whether 2's choice affects payoffs is at 1's
discretion. To check this, we also run an experimental Dictator game in which the procedures,
including the belief elicitation, were analogous to those discussed above. Letting ye [0,20] denote
the Dictator's choice of how much to allocate to the dummy player, we investigate the following
issues:
. Is the choice ofy lower in the Dictator game than in I'(x)?
. Is the dictator's choice ofy in the Dictator game positively correlated with her expectation of
the dummy player's expectation ofy?
We conclude this introduction by discussing some other related literature: Berg, Dickhaut, 8z
McCabe (1995) analyze a"trust game" which shazes many features with I'(x): Player 1 is given a
sum of money. He chooses how much to keep and "sends" the rest to player 2. The amount sent
is tripled and given to player 2 who chooses how much to "send back".6 Bolle (1995) reports
5 We investigate the potential importance of some non-pecuniary concerns that arise due to a choice that precedes a
dictator subgame. One can compare this to the Ultimatum game, in which an action is added that succeeds a
proposed dictator division: a responder gets to accept or reject the proposed split, and in the latter case, each player
gets a zero payoff. See Camerer 8t Thaler (1995) and GUth (1995) for detailed discussions of results in experimental
Ultimatum games. See Guth 8~ van Damme (1994) for a report on an experiment on a game which incorporates
essential elements of both the Dictator and the Ultimatum game.
6 I'(x) can be related to Berg et als game as follows: In I'(x) player 1 is given a certain amount ofmoney (x~0). He
chooses to send all or nothing to player 2. The amount sent is multiplied by a factor inversely related to x, and given
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experimental results involving a game which resembles I'(x), except that an element of chance
was added. A lottery was conducted to select fotu out of the 64 experimental games that were
played, and only the participants acting in these games were rewarded according to their
decisions.~ Bolle set x-'~~ and did not consider the effect of changing x. In both of these studies,
most participants did not behave according to the subgame perfect equilibrium with only self-
interested material considerations affecting payoffs.g
The paper is organized as follows: Section II explains the experimental procedure.
Section III presents the hypotheses we test, and the experimental results. Section IV contains a
discussion ofour main findings. Appendices 1-3 contain the experimental instructions.
2. Experimental procedure
The participants were recruited via an ad in the weekly students' newspaper at Tilburg University
and via posters on campus. These announcements invited participants to come to our offices and
"sign up" for an economic experiment on decision making. We indicated that the participants'
earnings would depend on these decisions, and approximately how much money was at stake.
In total we had 5 sessions of experimental i'(x) games and two sessions of experimental
Dictator games. 12 different pairs of students interacted in each session. In the I'(x) games, x was
to player 2 who makes a choice on how much money to "send back" to player l. I'(x) may be viewed as more
general than Berg et aPs game in allowing other exogenously given multiplication factors than 3, and more
restrictive in not allowing player 1 to send interrnediate amounts.
~ See Bolle (1990) for a discussion of whether such a set-up skews incentives relative to the case where all
participants are paid.
8 Several other authors have conducted experimental studies in which aspects of trust, reciprocity, and efficiency are
key features. See e.g. Fehr, Kirchsteiger, 8c Riedl (1993), Fehr, G~chter 8c Kirchsteiger (1997), GUth, Ockenfels Bz
Wendel (1994), van der Heijden, Nelissen, Potters, 8c Verbon (1997), and McKelvey 8c Palfrey (1992). However,
these experiments are relatively less closely related to ours (various real world market institutions are mimicked,
there is no "Dictator subgame", or there are more stages).
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fixed within a session and was changed between sessions to f4, 7, 10, 13, 16. For each session
we had invited 13 participants to Room A, 13 participants to Room B, and 4 extra participants to
a third room to cover for no-shows. After filling Rooms A and B with 13 participants (using
participants from the third room room if necessary) these where given an"Introduction" (see
Appendix 1). Then, they took an envelope at random. In each room, 12 envelopes contained 12
different numbers (A1,..,A12 in Room A and B1,..,B12 in Room B). These numbers were called
"registration numbers". One envelope was labeled "Monitor", and determined who was the
person who checked that we do not cheat. That person was paid the average of all other
participants in that session. After opening the envelopes the second part of the instruction was
distributed ( see Appendix 2). At this point it was stressed by the experimenter that this game will
be played only once.
Participants in Room A read the instruction for this part (see Appendix 2.). In the I'(x)
sessions, they were then asked to go to the experimenter, one at a time. They got an envelope
withfz in it, and then had to go behind a curtain. Over there they had to decide whether to take
the money out of the envelope or not. Then to write their registration number on a note, to put
this note in the envelope, and to put the envelope in a box near the experimenter.
Participants in Room B also read the instructions for this part (see Appendix 2). They
were asked to write down how much they would give to their anonymous counterpart in Room A
(i.e. to choose y), conditional on himlher choosing to leave the fx in the envelope in the I'(x)
treatments. The participants' choices, sealed in envelopes, were put in a box near the
experimenter.
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Then part 2 started. The participants in Room A received new instructions. They were
asked to guess the average y chosen by participants in Room B in part 1, and were rewazded
according to accuracy (see Appendix 3). Our intention was to provide incentives for them to state
their expectation of their co-player's choice ofy.9
The participants in Room B also received new instructions (see Appendix 3). In the I'(z)
sessions they were asked to guess the average guess of the pazticipants in Room A who chose to
leave the money in the envelope in part 1. In the Dictator game sessions they were asked to guess
the average guess of the participants in Room A. Meanwhile, an experimenter and the two
monitors checked and recorded the envelopes of Room A, and matched them each with an
envelope from Room B(as described in the instructions). In the end, all the payoffs from part 1
and 2 were calculated and the participants were privately paid.~o
3. Hypotheses and results
We now present the hypotheses we test and report on our experimental findings. We first discuss
the experimental game I'(x) and then the experimental Dictator game.
A. I'(x)
The experimental raw data concerning I'(x) is given in Tables 1 and 2.
9 We want to measure 1's expectation of the y chosen by his coplayer, but nevertheless ask 1 to guess the average
choice ofy in the whole session. We believe this creates a superior measure. Say, for example, that a participant
believes that the co-player will choose y-0 with probability '~z and otherwise choose y-j 10. Such a participant has
an expectation ofj5. With the incentive scheme we use he should indeed guess j5. Had we asked him to guess his
co-players choice he should guess eitherj0 or j10, however.
~o Note that while the participants were anonymous to each other, the experimenter could learn each one's decision.
The study of Hoffman, McCabe 8c Smith (1996) shows that it is then likely that dictators give away more than with
subject-experimenter anonymity. Probably a similar remark applies to I'(x), but the importance of "social distance"
concerns in general games is a matter of some controversy. See Hoffman, McCabe, Shachat 8i Smith (1994) and
Bolton 8c Zwick (1995) for some partly conflicting evidence, and Roth (1995, pp 298-302) for further discussion.
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x-4 x-7 x-10 x-13 x-16
Participant Choice Guess Choice Guess Choice Guess Choice Guess Choice Guess
1 L 4 T 2.5 T 1.25 T 0 T 0
2 L 5 T 3 T 5 T 0 T 1
3 L 8 T 4.5 T 5 T 0 T 1.65
4 L 8 T 6 T 10 T 3.5 T 2
5 L 8 T 7.5 L 6 T 4 T 2.5
6 L 8 T 8 L 7 T 5.5 T 3
7 L 8 L 0.75 L 8 T 6.25 T 4
8 L 8.45 L 4 L 8 T 9 T 4
9 L 8.5 L 4.75 L ]0 L 4 T 5.5
10 L 8.5 L 6 L l0 L 6 T 7
11 L 10 L 8 L 10 L 9 T 10
12 L 10 L 9 L 10 L 9 L 16.05
Average 12L112 7.87 6LI12 5.33 8LI12 7.52 4LI12 4.69 1LI12 4.73
Table 1: Raw data on player 1 in I'(x). For each treatment, the first column indicates strategy choice (T-Take,
L-Leave), and the second column indicates the guess of the average y.
x-4 x-7 x-10 x-13 x-16
Participant y Guess y Guess y Guess y Guess y Guess
1 0 6.5 0 4.5 0 4 0 0 0 4.5
2 4 5 0 8 0 4.5 0 7 0 5
3 4 6 0 8 I 10 0 13 0 Il
4 4 8 0 9.5 5 6 1 6 2 2
5 6 7 2 7 10 7 5 5 3 5
6 10 5 2 9 10 8 7 8 4 10
7 10 8.5 7 5 10 8.5 8 3 8 8
8 ]0 ]0 8 7 10 10 8 8 10 7.5
9 10 10 9 7.5 10 ]0 8 8.45 10 9
10 10 10 ]0 8 10 10 10 7.5 10 ]0
11 10 ]0 10 8 12 5 10 8.5 ]0 10
12 ]0 10 10 9 12.5 9 16.5 7.5 12 12
Average 7.33 8.00 4.83 7.54 7.54 7.67 6.12 6.83 5.75 7.83
Table 2: Raw data on player 2 in I'(x). For each treatment, the first column indicates the strategy choice, and the
second column indicates the guess of the average guess of y made by the players 1 who chose Leave.
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The following two hypotheses should find support if participants behave according to the
"classical solution" (subgame perfect equilibrium when each player's payoff depends only on his
monetary reward):
Hp: All players 1 choose Take
Hl : All players 2 choose Y0
Recall that twelve different pairs ofparticipants interacted in each treatment. Table 3 summarizes
for each treatment how many participants behaved according to the classical solution (e.g: in the
f 4 treatment, none out of the twelve players 1 chose Take. In the f 16 treatment, three players 2
chose YO).
x-~ x-J7 x-10 x-13 x-16
ti of Take 0 6 4 8 11
q of,y~ 1 4 2 2 3
Table 3: Number of choices made according to the classical solution in each treatment in I'(x).
It is clear by inspection of the table that the hypotheses Hp and Hl do not find much support.
We now move towards investigating what other patterns of behavioral regularities show
up in the data. We first focus on player 1, and then on player 2.
An efficient outcome results if and only if 1 chooses Leave. Is the propensity for player 1
to choose Leave related to the size ofx? By inspection ofTable 3 one immediately sees that the
number ofcases where 1 chooses Leave is (apart from thef 7 treatment) decreasing in x.
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Next we investigate whether monetary efficiency is achieved only when player 1 expects
to eam at least x. In that case the following hypothesis should find support:
H2: 1 chooses Leave only if 1's expectation ofy is at least x.
The procedure for measuring expectations is described in Section II and Appendix 3. The
relevant data are summarized in Table 4:
x--4 x-7 x-10 x-13 x-16
tl of Leave choices (efficent outcomes) 12 6 8 4 1
~ ofLeave choices by plsyers who
expect to get back at least x 12 2 4 0 ]
Proportion ofviolations ofH2 O112 4l6 4I8 4~4 0~l
Table 4: Efficiency and H2 for each treatment in I'(x).
In the J4 treatment every player 1 chose Leave and in all cases the player expected to get back
more than x, so H2 was never violated. In the J16 treatment we have only one observation, which
is in line with H2. However, in each of the fl, 10, and 13 treatments H2 is violated on four
occasions.
In the remainder of this section we focus on player 2. Her choice has bearing on monetary
payoffs ifand only if 1 chooses Leave. Thereby 1 risks losing the x he could have for sure, and
he gives 2 a shot at a positive payoff. To what extent does player 2 reciprocate in the sense of
choosing y~? By inspection ofTable 3, one sees that this happens quite often in thef 4, 7, and
10 treatments, but only happens once in the other treatments.
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A related aspect is that, azguably, the higher is x, the kinder is 1 by choosing Leave since
the potential loss he may incur by doing so is higher. Player 2 may want be kind in return by
correspondingly choosing a higher y. We expect an effect of this kind to motivate participants in
making their choices, and therefore test the following hypothesis which we expect to be able to
reject:
H3: y and x are uncorrelated.
We use the Wilcoxon test to investigate whether the samples ofy comes from populations with
the same median. We do a pairwise comparison by treatments. The nonpazametric Wilcoxon test
is appropriate because the distributions are clearly not normal (in fact, using the skewness and
kurtosis test for normality we can reject the hypothesis that y is normally distributed at a
significance level of .0007). In Table 5 we report test results. A number in the intersection of a
row and a column indicates, for the corresponding pair of treatments, the probability of getting at
least as extreme absolute values of the test statistic as we observe, given that H3 is true. (The last
row refers to the results in the Dictator game sessions to be discussed in the next subsection.)
x-4 x-7 x-10 x-13 x-16
x-4 - .1124 .6033 .3408 .3865
x-7 - .0941 .7290 .4705
x-10 - .2253 .3123
x-13 - .3123
x-16 -
Dictator .2821 .4423 .1523 1.0000 .9455
Table 5: Wilcoxon tests with pairwise comparisons of inedians ofy by treatments in I'(x)
(Prob ~ ~ z~, where z is the test statistic).
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Table 5 conveys a result we find surprising. At the five percent level, H3 is not rejected for any
of the pairs of treatments.
Finally, we ask whether there is positive correlation between y and 2's expectation of 1's
expectation of y(conditional on 1 choosing Leave; we henceforth suppress this qualification).
This would be in line with the idea that 2 might be "averse to letting 1 down" in the sense that
she does not want to give 1 less than 1 expects to get. Of course, 2 does know 1's expectation,
which is why we focus on 2's expectation of this.
H4: y is positively correlated with 2's expectation of 1's expectation ofy
We first use the Spearman rank correlation coefficient (rs) to test for the exístence of conelation
between y and 2's expectation of 1's expectation of y. We run the test for the entire 60
observations because, as shown above, the hypotheses that the choices of y in different
treatments come from the same distribution can not be rejected. We find that rs .40, and that H4
can not be rejected at the five percent level (in fact, H4 can be rejected only at levels smaller than
.0016). We interpret this as support for H4. After ensuring the existence of con elation, we
measure the degree of correlation: There is a positive correlation of .35 between y and 2's
expectation of 1's expectation ofy.
The connection between y and 2's expectation of 1's expectation ofy is illustrated in the
diagrams of Figure 2. For each treatment (including the Dictator game to be discussed in the next
subsection) the choices of the participants in the player 2 position are plotted in increasing order,
with the relevant second-order expectation ofy plotted alongside.
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B. The Dictator game
The experimental raw data concerning the Dictator game is given in Tables 6 and 7.
Perticipant y Guess Participant y Guess
1 0 0 13 7 3
2 0 3 14 7 7
3 0 4 15 7 8
4 2 3.5 16 7 12
5 3 5 17 8 6
6 3 8 I8 10 3
7 4 5 19 10 5
8 5 5 20 10 5
9 5 7.5 21 10 10
10 5 10 22 10 10
11 6 7 23 10 10
12 7 6 24 10 10
Average 6.08 6.38
Tsble 6: Raw data on the dictator in the Dictator game. For each participant, the first column indicates the strategy
choice, and the second column indicates the guess of the dummy players' average guess ofy.
Participant Guess Participant Guess
1 0 13 8
2 0 14 8
3 2 IS S
4 2 16 8.3
5 2 17 10
6 3 18 10
7 3 19 10
8 3.15 20 10
9 5 21 10
10 5 22 10
ll 7 23 10
12 7.5 24 15
Average 6.54
Table 7: Raw data on the dummy player in the Dictator game. For each participant, the numbers indicates the guess
ofthe average y.
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In I'(x) 2's subgame is reached only if 1 chooses Leave. If 2 is motivated by reciprocity
considerations, she might choose y higher than she would as a dictator in a Dictator game (where
the choice of y has payoff consequences independently of 1's behavior). Then the following
hypothesis should be rejected:
H5: The same y is chosen in the Dictator game and in I'(x)
Refer back to Table 5. HS is not rejected for any value of x. We find this surprising (although
perhaps less so given that H3 was not rejected).
Finally we test the following hypothesis (motivated along the same lines as H4):
H6: In the Dictator game, y is positively con elated with 2's expectation of 1's expectation
ofy
Again, we first use the Spearman rank correlation coefficient (rs) to test for the existence of
correlation between y and 2's expectation of 1's expectation ofy. We find that rs .44, and that
H6 can not be rejected at the five percent level. We interpret this as support for the hypothesis
that y and 2's expectation of 1's expectation ofy aze correlated. ARer ensuring the existence of
correlation, we measure the degree of conelation: There is a positive correlation of .51 between y
and 2's expectation of 1's expectation ofy.
In the last diagram of Figure 2 the dictator choices of y are plotted in increasing order,
with the relevant second-order expectation ofy plotted alongside.
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4. Discussion
In this section we discuss our results, focusing on players I and 2 in turn.
A. Results onplayer 1
The higher is x, the fewer players 1 choose Leave (apart from in thef 7 treatment). We find this
result quite intuitive, since the potential loss that 1 may experience by choosing Leave is
increasing in x.
It is perhaps more surprising that several players 1 choose Leave even when (our estimate
of) their expectation ofy was lower than x. Experiments in which participants chose to give up
money to other participants aze not new in the literature-see the discussion in the introduction
about the dictator game literature, or witness many participants' behavior in the player 2 position
of our game. However, as faz as we know, there is little documented evidence indicating that
players aze willing to give up money in a way which increases monetary efficiency in situation
where they expect a co-player to treat them unfavorably.
We find this result to be interesting and we note that it was made possible because we
explicitly measured beliefs. While we think measuring beliefs is often a useful thing to do, a
word ofcaution is in order. A risk avert individual in the player 1 position may have an incentive
to understate his expectation of y in order to cover himself in case 2 gives back less than he
expects. This observation suggests that perhaps our finding that several players 1 choose Leave
despite not expecting to get back x should be interpreted cautiously. More generally, it also
suggests that one should be aware that it is a delicate matter how to measure beliefs and provide
proper incentives.
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B. Results on player 2
We have reported that player 2 quite often reciprocates in the sense of choosing y~ in the j4, 7,
and 10 treatments, while this almost never happens in the j 13 and 16 treatments. This result
seems consistent with the findings by Berg et al (1995) that in their experimental game (cf.
footnote X above) many players 2 send back no less than their counterpazt sent them. ~~ One
possible explanation of our results could be that player 2 is reluctant to give 1 more than one half
of the j 20 that may be split. For x5j10, reciprocity in the sense that y~ can then be achieved
while maintaining the no-more-than-one-half constraint. Since reciprocity is mutual, players 2
are more likely to reciprocate at x less than or equal to 10, since 2 will assume that 1 understands
the constraint. This explains the bifurcation of the data at x-10.
We find no correlation between x and y in the experimental data. Indeed, the behavior of
player 2 looks much like in a Dictator game. This result may be compazed to the finding of Berg
et al (1993) that there appeazs to be no correlation between the amount sent and the amount sent
back.1z Also van der Heijden et al (1997) report a similaz result. Arguably, the more money is
sent, the more kind is player 1. Our set-up is different in that player 1 can only be kind in one
way (by choosing Leave), but, in a sense, we control for how kind 1 is by using x as a treatment
variable. This difference between the designs turns out to be unimportant.
We find that y is positively correlated with 2's expectation of 1's expectation ofy. Such
correlation is in line with the idea that 2 may be averse to letting 1 down in the sense that 2
wishes not to give 1 less than 1 expects to get. Since 2 does not know 1's expectation of y she
~~ Lack of reciprocity when xe { 13,16} cannot be taken as evidence against this similarity, because in Berg et aPs
game the "multiplication factor" (cf footnote 5) is always 3 and hence never as low as 20I13 or 20I16.
~Z in Berg et afs "social history" treatment (in which participant were informed about the choices made in earlier
sessions before making choices) they find "an increase in the cortelation between amounts sent and payback
decisions" (p 135), which suggests that this result is sensitive to the social setting.
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sould judge this by her expectation of 1's expectation ofy, which then will be correlated with 2's
choice y. We note that such effects can be modeled by incotporating beliefs directly into a
player's utility function along the lines suggested by Geanakoplos, Peazce 8z Stacchetti (1989).13
13 Geanakoplos et al provide several examples of how their theory can be used to incorporate "emotions" in
strategic analysis. These effects are qualitatively different from many other ideas that have been advanced to
rationalize experimental data, like wartn glow of giving in Andreoni (1990), altruism in Andreoni 8c Miller (1994),
aversion to unfair treatment in Bolton (1991), and empathy and gratitude in Falk á Stark (1996). In these cases, the
relevant utilities can be defined on strategy profiles only. By contrast, in Geanakoplos et aPs theory each player's
utility is defined on a richer domain, which includes the player's subjective beliefs. Rabin (1993) makes use of such
ideas to develop a theory of fairness.
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Appendix 1
{ When the participants arrived they were directed to their seats. The participants in Room A
received the following written instruction. The instruction in Room B was identical except that
"Room A" was substitutedfor "Room B" everywhere in the text, and vice versa. }
Instruction for persons in Room A
You are about to participate in an experimental study of decision making. The experiment will
last about an hour. In the experiment, each of you will be paired with a different person who is in
another room. You will not be told who this person is either during or after the experiment. This
is Room A, the other person is in Room B. As you notice, there aze other people in the same
room with you who aze also participating in this experiment. You will not be paired with any of
these people.
After reading this instruction, we ask you to draw one envelope from this box. In the
envelope you will find a note with your 'registration number', which will be used throughout the
experiment. After observing this note, please put it back in the envelope so no one else will see
it. You will be asked to show this note later on when you will be paid. One envelope is an
exception to this rule. Instead of a number, this envelope contains the announcement 'Monitor A'.
The monitor will watch us while we carry out the experiment and assist us from time to time. An
analogous procedure to detenmine the 'registration number' and to select 'Monitor B' is used in
Room B. Every student will getf8 as a show up fee, and in addition you may eazn money in the
experiment. Some of the money will be given to you during the experiment, and the rest at the
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end of it. The monitor will receive a payment equal to the average payoff of all other students in
the experiment. All the money will be payed in cash.
From the moment you have drawn an envelope you aze no longer allowed to talk or
communicate with the other participants. If you have a question, please raise yow hand and one
of us will come to yow table. As soon as everyone has taken hislher envelope, we will distribute
further instructions.
Are there any questions about what has been said up till now?
Appendix 2
{After the participants had read the instruction they received upon their arrival and clarifying
questions had be answered (these were rare), we distributed the following instruction (identical
in both rooms) in the session with the treatment in which xf4 . Substitute 'f 7, 10, 13, 16"jor
'f4" to get the instruction participants received in the other I'(x) sessions. In the two Dictator
game sessions subjects received instructions which described that game, but were otherwise
analogously formulated. }
The Procedure
The decision procedwe will be as follows: Each person in Room A will get an additional f4 and
have two options:
(a) to take the j4. In this case (s)he gives back an empty envelope, and the person with
whom helshe is matched in Room B does not get to split any money.
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(b) to leave thej4 in the envelope. In that case the person in Room B with whom helshe
is matched with will get to split fL0 between the two of them. That is, the person in Room B
decides how much of jL0 to give to the person in Room A, and how much of it to keep.
The remainder of these instructions will explain exactly how this experiment is nin: Each
person in Room A will get an envelope with j4 and a note, and then, one at a time, will go
behind a curtain. Over there (s)he will be asked to write hislher registration number on the note
and put the note back into the envelope. Then, (s)he will have to decide whether to "take it or
leave it". That is, whether to "take" (and keep) the j 4 and give back the envelope without the
money, or to "leave" the j4 in the envelope. The person in Room A will be asked to put the
envelope in a box neaz the experimenter. If the person in Room A decides to take the money,
then the person with whom (s)he is matched in Room B will not get any money to split. If the
person in Room A decides to leave the money in the envelope, then the person with whom (s)he
is matched in Room B will getfL0 to split between the two of them.
If the person in Room A leaves thef4, then f20 will be made available to split between
the two paired players. The split will be determined by the person in Room B. Each person in
Room B will be asked to decide how much money out of fL0 to give to the person in Room A
with whom helshe is matched. The persons in Room B aze asked to write their decisions on a
sheet of paper which is given to them, and then to put this sheet of paper in their envelope, and
the envelope in a box neaz the experimenter. Note that this decision by the person in Room B
will be relevant only if the person in Room A chose to leave the j4.
Then, Monitor A will take the box from Room A, and Monitor B will take the box from
Room B. Together with an experimenter, they will match each envelope of Room A with the
envelope of the person in Room B that has the same registration number, i.e. A1 will be matched
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with B1, A2 with B2 etc. If the envelope of the person in Room A will be empty, then no
additional money will be given. If the envelope of Room A will contain the f4, then the note in
the envelope from Room B will determine how to split the fZ0 between the two persons. The
experimenter (with the monitors observing) will record the payoff of each of you. You will be
paid at the end ofthe experiment.
The experiment is structured so that, apart from the experimenter, no one will know the
decisions ofpeople in either Room A or Room B. Since your decision is private, we ask that you
do not tell anyone your decision either during or after the experiment.
Appendix 3
{After the participants' choices had been collected, in each treatment they received instructions
asfollows. }
Question
{To participants in Room A only: }
Now we ask you to guess what was the average amount that persons in Room B chose to give
back to the persons in Room A. Your rewazd will depend on your accuracy.
{To participants in Room B only: }
We asked the persons in Room A to guess how much the person in Room B chose to give back
to them. We now ask you to guess what was the average of the guesses of the persons in Room
A, but we consider only the persons that also chose to leave the money in the envelope. In other
words, we do not consider the the guesses of those who chose not to leave the money. If no one
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in Room A chose to leave the money, then you will be paid f5 regardless of your choice.
Otherwise, your rewazd will depend on your accuracy.
{For al!participants the instruction continued asjollows: }
In order to check whether your guess is accurate, one of the experimenters will calculate
this average, from the envelopes of the persons in Room B. You will be rewazded in the
following way: You will start withf5, and for every 1 cent of mistake, 1 cent will be deducted
from this f5. The mistake is the absolute value of ( your guess - the actual average). For
example, if you will guess accurately, you will get f5. If you miss by, say jl, (i.e. your guess is
either two guilders too high or two guilders too low), you will be paidf3. If your mistake will be
larger than or equal to f5, then you will not be payed at all for this part.
Please write your guess and your registration number on this sheet, and wait for the
experimenter to collect the sheets.
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Neoclassical economics is based on a model of a rational decision
maker who maximizes his utility. However, a growing body of empirical
evidence show that the rational decision making model fails to
describe how real people behave. The question economists face is
whether the empirical facts should be allowed to spoil the good story.
I think they should.
A relatively new area of research in economics, which can be called
"behavioral economics", is aimed at closing that gap by improving the
descriptive power of models. While normative models are typically
based on a set of "rational" assumptions, the descriptive models are
based on assumptions which are motivated by observed behavior.
The first step in building better descriptive models is finding the
relevant behavioral regularities. For that purpose economists adopted
a tool, which psychologists have been using for a very long time:
Experiments.
This thesis contains a collection of papers which form my first steps
into this world.
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